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I. INTRODUCTION
“Most men . . . think themselves in possession of all truth, and
that wherever others differ from them it is so far error.”1
At the founding of our nation, the grounds for disqualification of
judges and justices were very few and fairly narrow. In fact, the only
ground for disqualifying a jurist was that he possessed a direct
pecuniary interest in the pending case.2 Since that time, the grounds for
judicial disqualification have slowly, but steadily, been broadened—by
both the legislatures and the courts.3 Now jurists may be disqualified in
all federal courts and most state courts on account of: (1) a financial or
other personal interest; (2) a relational interest; (3) a political interest; or
(4) other reasons reflecting actual, probable, or apparent partiality.4
This expansion of the grounds for disqualification reflects a shift in
social science from the 18th to the 21st Centuries that changed the
public’s view of the psychology of judges.5 The 18th Century jurist was
revered as a rational economic man vulnerable only to the sway of
financial interests.6 But, we are all legal realists now and are more likely
to view jurists as ordinary people influenced by both conscious and nonconscious motives. This shift in perspective over time has resulted in
Benjamin Franklin, Literary Trials: Constitutional Convention Speech, in 36 LITIGATION 1,
64 (2010).
2
See infra Part II.B (discussing a judge’s relational interest in a case).
3
See infra Part III (noting the broadening of judicial disqualification in both the
legislature and courts).
4
See infra Part II.A–C (providing examples of interests that a jurist may be disqualified
for).
5
See infra Part IV.A (showing a shift in the grounds for disqualification and its effect on
the public’s view of judges).
6
See infra Part II.C (describing how 18th Century jurists could be swayed by money
bribes).
1
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reforms of the substantive standards to include an increasing number of
specific interest-based grounds for disqualification.7 However, there has
been little, if any, reshaping of the procedural practices used in
disqualification disputes.8 In fact, in all federal and most state courts the
challenged jurist remains the initial, and often final, arbiter of his own
actual, probable, or apparent partiality—a practice adopted long ago
from English common law.9
As a result, we are left with an out-of-date and out-of-sync system in
which the practice of “self-disqualification” prevails and other
procedural protections are eschewed. At the same time, the substantive
standards have shifted to require the challenged jurist to make an
objective assessment of his own actual, probable, or apparent biases in an
increasing number of instances.10 This chancy combination of the
substantive standards and the procedural practices introduces the risk of
systemic error in disqualification decisions because it requires the
challenged jurist to be unbiased about his own biases.11 That objectivity,
we now know, is virtually impossible due to the Bias Blind Spot.12 As a
result, the procedural practices used in disqualification disputes need to
be reshaped to account for the Bias Blind Spot.13
Given how the Bias Blind Spot operates, those reforms must include:
(1) either eliminating the challenged jurist from the decision making
process or, at a minimum, providing for prompt de novo review of the
challenged jurist’s determination; (2) requiring meaningful disclosure by
both the jurist and the parties; and (3) mandating that any order denying
disqualification be in writing, include reasons, and be published.14
In support of this thesis, Part II of this Article describes the most
prevalent and persistent problems with partiality through a series of
examples from the United States Supreme Court and the highest state
courts, which illuminate the four basic types of conflicts or biases.15 In
Part III the interplay of substantive standards and current procedural

See infra Part III.A (explaining specific federal and state interest-based grounds for
disqualification).
8
See infra Part V (analyzing the ways in which recusal procedures need to be reshaped
to avoid the Bias Blind Spot).
9
See infra Part III.C (noting that federal and most state courts use self-disqualification).
10
See infra Part III.A.5 (discussing the objective standard used by federal and state codes
of judicial conduct).
11
See infra Part IV.A (providing that the Bias Blind Spot distorts disqualification
decisions).
12
See infra Part IV (defining the Bias Blind Spot).
13
See infra Part V.A (recommending new procedural reforms for self-disqualification).
14
See infra Part V.A (listing the procedural reforms).
15
See infra Part II (describing the problems with partiality).
7
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practices in disqualification disputes is examined.16 In Part IV the
fundamental features of the Bias Blind Spot that interfere with a jurist’s
clear vision of his own biases are described so that the procedural
reforms suggested in Part V can be evaluated for effectiveness.17 Part V
also addresses the most common criticisms or challenges to the proposed
procedural reforms.18 In Part VI the primary purposes of partiality in
our justice system—protection of litigants’ rights to a fair trial, creation
of public confidence in the courts, and support of jurists as ethical
actors—are explored to give a clearer vision of the goals that recusal
reform should realize.19 This Article concludes that the proposed
procedural reforms will further the identified goals of disqualification by
creating disqualification procedures that are, or at least appear to be,
impartial.20
II. PARTIALITY PROBLEMS
The problem of judicial partiality pre-dates the creation of our nation
and has persisted throughout recorded time.21 In fact, some of the
earliest references to judicial conflicts of interest in Western literary and
legal texts date back to antiquity.22 Since that time, both literature and
the law have chronicled persistent problems with the partiality of
jurists.23 While there are a variety of ways these partiality problems
could be categorized, at least one well-respected scholar has identified
four general grounds for disqualification based upon a jurist’s partiality:
(1) financial and other personal interests; (2) relational interests; (3)
political interests; and (4) other bias.24 These four general grounds are

See infra Part III (examining substantive and current procedural practices).
See infra Part IV (describing the Bias Blind Spot).
18
See infra Part V (addressing criticisms to the proposed procedural reforms).
19
See infra Part VI (exploring goals of recusal reform).
20
See infra Part VII (concluding that the proposed procedural reforms will further the
goals of disqualification).
21
See Charles Gardner Geyh, The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality, 65 FLA. L. REV. 493,
498 (2013) [hereinafter The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality] (noting that impartiality dates
back to antiquity).
22
See id. (quoting FRANKLIN ADAM PIERCE, BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 466 (1952). “Plato
recounts that in 399 BC Socrates described a judge’s responsibilities in the following way:
‘Four things belong to a judge: to hear courteously, to answer wisely, to consider soberly,
and to decide impartially.’” Id.
23
See id. at 499 (discussing partiality problems of the past with reference to literature).
24
See id. at 499–505 (describing four categories of partiality problems). The terms
“impartial” and “unbiased” are not identical. The Black’s Law Dictionary defines
“impartial” as “unbiased and disinterested.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 568 (10th ed. 2014).
The term “bias” is defined as an inclination, prejudice, or predilection and “disinterested”
means “free from bias, prejudice, or partiality [or] not having a pecuniary interest.” Id.
16
17
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briefly described and illustrative recent examples are explained to set the
stage for a discussion about how the combination of current substantive
standards and procedural rules creates partiality problems that the
reforms suggested in this Article are designed to address.25
A. Financial or Other Personal Interests in the Case
There are several types of personal interests that may disqualify a
jurist from hearing a case, but the most common and obvious are
financial interests.26 The “archetype of the partial judge is the corrupt
jurist who solicits or accepts bribes.”27 However, partial judges are not
limited to those who take the bribes, but also include jurists who actually
do or, at least appear to, misuse judicial power for personal gain in other
forms:
indirect financial benefit, sexual favors, and reputational
interests.28 These partiality problems exist for jurists presiding over
cases in both the federal and state court systems, including the courts of
last resort.29
In recent years the financial and personal interests of judges and
justices who are elected to the bench have received a lot of attention in
the scholarly and public debates.30 Perhaps the most notable recent
example at the level of a state’s highest court is Caperton v. A.T. Massey
Coal Company, Inc., in which the acting Chief Justice Brett Benjamin
refused to recuse himself even though the CEO of the party in whose
favor Chief Justice Benjamin voted had provided nearly $3.5 million to
support the jurist’s election to the state supreme court because Chief
Justice Benjamin believed he was not, in fact, biased.31 The matter was
litigated all the way to the United States Supreme Court (“SCOTUS”),
which held that the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution
mandated Chief Justice Benjamin’s disqualification because the election

While these terms are not exactly synonymous, they are sufficiently similar—at least when
used in the judicial disqualification context—as to be used interchangeably in this Article.
25
See infra Part II.A–D (discussing partiality problems).
26
See The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality, supra note 21, at 500 (finding examples of
personal interests that suggest actual, probable, or apparent partiality in literature).
27
Id. at 499.
28
See id. at 499–501 (exploring literature and actual cases to provide examples of bribes,
indirect financial benefits, and sexual favors gained through abuse of judicial power).
29
See infra notes 31–35 and accompanying text (discussing the partiality of state and
federal judges).
30
See infra notes 31–38 and accompanying text (providing examples of judges with
financial interests).
31
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 679 S.E.2d 223, 285–86 (W. Va. 2008)
(Benjamin, C.J., concurring) (stating that “the touchstone of a judicial system’s fairness is
actual justice” which “derives from actual impartiality”).
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support offered by an interested party created “a constitutionally
intolerable probability of actual bias.”32
However, even jurists appointed for life terms are not immune from
partiality problems based upon personal interests-financial or
otherwise.33 For example, in 2011, the impartiality of both Justice Scalia
and Justice Thomas was questioned because they participated in the
Citizens United v. FEC case after both Justices apparently attended an
invitation-only political retreat hosted by Koch Industries, Inc., whose
political action committee supported the dismantling of the campaign
finance laws at issue in the Citizens United case.34 Of course, Justices
Scalia and Thomas are not the only federal judges to attend such
junkets.35 In addition, there are other examples of questionable refusals
to recuse involving the personal interests (involving the reputations and
prior participation) of SCOTUS Justices, including the following cases.36
In 1972, Justice Rehnquist declined to disqualify himself in Laird v.
Tatum, which involved a challenge to the constitutionality of a domestic
surveillance program that targeted Vietnam War dissidents.37 Although
he had testified before Congress in support of the program at issue,
Justice Rehnquist participated in the case.38 The backlash to Rehnquist’s
refusal to recuse was so strong that it helped galvanize the need for
Id. at 868, 882.
See, e.g., Justice Rehnquist’s Decision to Participate in Laird v. Tatum, 73 COLUM. L. REV
106, 117 (1973) [hereinafter Rehnquist’s Decision] (discussing Justice Rehnquist’s
participation in Laird v. Tatum); Jeanne Cummings, Reform Group: Antonin Scalia, Clarence
Thomas Had Citizens United Conflicts of Interest, POLITICO (Jan. 19, 2011, 7:27 PM),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0111/47855.html, archived at http://perma.cc/
XK7Q-DKRU (reviewing a reform group’s call for an investigation of Justices Scalia and
Thomas’ opinions in Citizens United).
34
See Eric Lichtblau, Advocacy Group Says Justices May Have Conflict in Campaign Finance
Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/20/us/
politics/20koch.html?_r=0&pagewanted=print, archived at http://perma.cc/V6RA-P35M
(discussing Common Cause’s request for an investigation of Justices Thomas and Scalia).
35
See, e.g., Editorial, Time to Ban Judicial Junkets, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/15/opinion/15sat3.html?_r=0,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/3STT-YEFH (calling for bold action against private interests lobbying
judges); Glen Elsasser, Activists Shine Light on Junkets for Judges, CHI. TRIB. (July 25, 2000),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2000-07-25/news/0007250276_1_federal-judgescommunity-rights-counsel-seminars, archived at http://perma.cc/U8YY-V86M (providing
examples of other federal judges who attend all expenses paid seminars).
36
See infra notes 37–41 and accompanying text (citing examples of justices that have
declined to recuse themselves).
37
See Rehnquist’s Decision, supra note 33, at 117 (discussing Justice Rehnquist’s
participation as a witness for the Justice Department’s issue on government surveillance);
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 589, 592 (1987)
(reviewing Justice Rehnquist’s service as head of the Justice Department’s Office of Legal
Counsel to the White House).
38
Stempel, supra note 37, at 592.
32
33
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reform that resulted in Congress passing legislation to amend the federal
recusal statute.39
In 2003, Justice Breyer participated when SCOTUS decided
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America v. Walsh, in which an
association of drug manufacturers challenged the constitutionality of
certain state prescription drug regulations.40 Some legal ethicists
questioned Justice Breyer’s participation in the case because the Justice
held stock in some of the pharmaceutical companies that were members
of the association.41
B. Relational Interests in the Case
There may be concern in a given case that a jurist’s impartiality
could be compromised due to pre-existing personal relationships with
litigants or other parties interested in the outcome of the case.42 The
interested person may be family, a “friend,” or a “foe” of the jurist.43
Again, these problems arise at the highest levels in both the federal and
court state systems.44
In 2008, Justice Annette Ziegler of the Wisconsin Supreme Court was
publicly reprimanded by her colleagues for presiding over cases when
she was an appeals court judge in which her husband’s business was a
party to the litigation.45 These same relational interests can affect
SCOTUS Justices.46 In fact, a personal relationship was at the heart of the
dispute in the 1945 case of Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local 6167.47 In that
39
See id. at 594–95 & n.32 (noting the additional momentum Justice Rehnquist’s
participation gave to reformists).
40
See Monroe H. Freedman, Judicial Impartiality in the Supreme Court—The Troubling Case
of Justice Stephen Breyer, 30 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 513, 527 (2005) (discussing Justice Breyer’s
stock held in one of the three pharmaceutical companies that was suing Pharmaceutical
Research and Manufactures of America).
41
Id. at 527.
42
The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality, supra note 21, at 502.
43
Id.
44
See infra notes 45–54 and accompanying text (providing examples of justices with
relational interests in a case).
45
See Steven Elbow, State Supreme Court Reprimands Ziegler in Unprecedented Ruling, CAP.
TIMES (May 28, 2008), http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-179495976.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/8SBV-NPRN (discussing Justice Ziegler’s public reprimand); Dee J. Hall,
Ziegler is Given a Public Reprimand, MADISON.COM (May 29, 2008, 12:00 AM),
http://host.madison.com/news/ziegler-is-given-a-public-reprimand/article_07a048a56e12-533a-b78c-6059e7d6c120.html, archived at http://perma.cc/Z7PP-VRDQ (describing
Justice Ziegler’s conflict of interest in cases).
46
See infra notes 47–54 and accompanying text (providing examples of Supreme Court
Justices with relational interests in cases).
47
See ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE’S RECUSAL DECISIONS SHOULD BE
TRANSPARENT AND REVIEWABLE 4 (2011), available at http://www.afj.org/wp-
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case, Justice Black declined to disqualify himself even though his former
law partner represented one of the victorious litigants.48 Justice Black’s
decision to participate in the rehearing engendered strong criticisms
from his colleague, Justice Robert Jackson.49
While there was no reprimand or even reproach by his colleagues,
Justice Scalia was called to task by some scholars and the media when he
refused to recuse himself from a case brought by the Sierra Club against
then Vice-President Dick Cheney.50 Apparently, while the case was
impending, Justice Scalia (and some of his family members) went duck
hunting with Cheney and accepted a free ride on the Vice-President’s
jet.51 Despite loud calls questioning whether he appeared to be
impartial, Justice Scalia denied the Sierra Club’s request that he step
aside and then cast his vote in support of the Vice President’s position in
the litigation.52
More recently, Justice Thomas’ participation in the challenge to the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act was criticized by liberal
members of Congress and some commentators.53 They raised questions
about Justice Thomas’ partiality because Ginni Thomas, the Justice’s
wife, was a founder and active supporter of Liberty Central, and a wellpaid lobbyist for the Heritage Foundation and other conservative
political organizations that supported overturning the law.54

content/uploads/2013/11/recusal-afj-memo.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/475W-GP4Q
(discussing Justice Black’s participation in the case).
48
See id. (discussing Justice Black’s refusal to recuse himself).
49
See Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local 6167, 325 U.S. 897, 897 (1945) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (listing the limited grounds on which Justice Jackson concurred).
50
See Monroe H. Freedman, Duck-Blind Justice: Justice Scalia’s Memorandum in the
Cheney Case, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 229, 229 (2004) (evaluating Justice Scalia’s decision to
not recuse himself in Cheney v. United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of Columbia).
51
See Michael C. Dorf, Justice Scalia’s Persuasive But Elitist Response to the Duck Hunting
Controversy, FINDLAW (Mar. 24, 2004), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20040324.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/9ULG-KMXA (explaining why Justice Scalia’s trip with VicePresident Dick Cheney creates the appearance of impropriety).
52
See Cheney v. United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of Columbia, 541 U.S. 913, 929
(2004) (providing the order by Justice Scalia denying Sierra Club’s motion to disqualify
him).
53
See Felicia Sonmez, House Democrats Say Thomas Should Recuse Himself in Health-Care
Case, WASH. POST (Feb. 9, 2011, 12:21 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2011/
02/house-democrats-say-justice-th.html,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/M3VS-XSEP
(reviewing a letter asking Justice Thomas to recuse himself).
54
See id. (reviewing the conflict of interest between Justice Thomas and his wife, Ginni
Thomas’ role as a lobbyist).
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C. Political Interests in the Case
The possible influence of political interests or ideologies is another
concern when a jurist’s impartiality—whether actual, probable, or
apparent—is at stake.55 The political interests that might influence a case
can be divided into interests emanating from external and internal
sources.56 External political interests are those that threaten a jurist’s
impartiality because his “political future is subject to manipulation or
control by others who have an interest in the outcomes of cases the
[jurist] decides.”57 Internal political interests “relate to ideological zeal,
which can bias the [jurist] for or against litigants and lead [the jurist] to
prejudge cases.”58 There have been a number of recent high profile cases
in both state and federal courts where the impartiality of a jurist was
questioned based upon either external or internal political interests.59
The political interests of jurists are most often questioned in
instances where judges are elected or when the jurist presides over
politically sensitive or other controversial cases. The Caperton case and
other recent examples of high-stakes judicial elections exemplify external
political interests because the elected jurist is, probably is, or at least
appears to be, beholden to the special interest groups that help elect
them.60 However, even jurists who are appointed for life terms may be
improperly influenced by internal politics.61 The most common modern
concerns involve so called “activist judges”—jurists whose
interpretations and applications of applicable law are, or appear to be,
influenced by the jurist’s personal ideology.62 The claims of judicial
activism come from both the right and left ends of the political spectrum
and even involve jurists at the highest level of the federal and state court
systems.63 In fact, some recent cases pending before SCOTUS have given

The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality, supra note 21, at 503.
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
See infra notes 60–62 and accompanying text (providing examples of judges with a
political interest in a case).
60
See supra notes 37–41 and accompanying text (giving examples of cases where
Supreme Court Justices had a personal interest).
61
See The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality, supra note 21, at 505 (noting that even
Supreme Court Justices are accused of judicial activism).
62
Id. (describing earlier efforts by conservative court critics against liberal leaning jurists
“who allegedly disregarded the law and substituted their political preferences” when
making decisions and the more recent efforts of liberals to label jurists whose decisions are
seen as more conservative as “judicial activists” as well).
63
See id. (discussing claims of judicial activism that emanate from conservatives and
liberals).
55
56
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rise to controversies regarding the political ideologies of some of the
Justices.64
The problem of political interests is well illustrated by calls from
conservatives in recent years for Justice Ginsberg to recuse herself from
cases involving abortion and other reproductive rights issues, which are
based upon the fact that she was a member of the NOW Legal Defense
and Education Fund team before serving as a jurist.65 In fact, in 2004,
when NOW’s advocacy group filed an amicus curie brief in a case testing
a state’s obligations to provide medical screenings to low-income
children, some on the political right criticized Justice Ginsberg for taking
part in the case because of her NOW affiliation.66 Justice Ginsberg was
criticized again when only two weeks later she gave the opening
remarks at the Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg Distinguished Lecture Series
on Women and the Law, which was co-sponsored by NOW.67 Thus,
even jurists who are not subject to election can be seen as influenced by
political forces.
D. Personal Bias for or Against a Party or Participant
The type of personal bias in this category is a catch-all for forms of
partiality that do not neatly fit within the descriptions of the jurist’s
personal (especially financial), relational, or political interests.68 While
some interests and biases will overlap, this last category includes bias for
or against persons because they are members of a particular race,
nationality, ethnicity, gender, socio-economic class, sexual orientation or
other identifiable group.69 Again, in recent years challenges of personal
bias for or against a party or participant have been raised against jurists
at all levels on both the federal and state bench.70
The sponsors of California’s Proposition 8, which would have
banned gay marriage, sought to disqualify the presiding jurist, Chief
Judge Walker, who is a gay man in a long-term relationship.71 After
64
See infra notes 64–66 and accompanying text (providing an example of cases before the
Supreme Court involving bias controversies).
65
Richard A. Serrano & David G. Savage, Ginsburg Has Ties to Activist Group, L.A. TIMES
(Mar. 11, 2004), http://articles.latimes.com/2004/mar/11/nation/na-ginsbug11, archived
at http://perma.cc/G9NX-3376.
66
Id.
67
See id. (citing to several legal experts’ opinions on the matter).
68
The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality, supra note 21, at 505.
69
See id. at 505–507 (providing examples from literature to describe status or group
based bias).
70
See infra notes 70–73 and accompanying text (noting that accusations of bias affect
jurists at all levels).
71
See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 790 F. Supp. 1119, 1122–23 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (describing
the motion of the defendant-intervenors seeking to vacate the judgment on the grounds the
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Chief Judge Walker retired (and when his order holding the law
unconstitutional was on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit), a newspaper article reported that Chief Judge Walker
“shared that he was gay and that he was in a [long-term] same-sex
relationship at the time when he was presiding over this case.”72
Thereafter, the sponsors of Proposition 8 sought an order from the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California
challenging former Chief Judge Walker’s participation in the trial citing
his sexual orientation.73 The new Chief Judge of the court ruled that
Judge Walker was not biased and did not have to recuse himself simply
because he was gay and might be affected by the ruling as a private
citizen.74
Similarly, activists on the political left have taken issue with Justice
Scalia’s participation in the cases regarding recognition of gay marriages
under federal and state law.75 The challengers do more than simply
criticize Justice Scalia’s participation based upon his dissenting opinions
in earlier gay rights cases, which would not be grounds for
disqualification.76 Instead, the challengers point to Justice Scalia’s
remarks at a book tour event at Princeton University when he responded
to a gay student’s question about Justice Scalia’s opinions in those prior
gay rights cases.77
presiding judge was or could reasonably appear to be biased based upon his sexual
orientation).
72
Id. at 1121.
73
See id. (stating that the Motion to Vacate was based on the premise that Judge
Walker’s same-sex relationship disqualified him from presiding over the case).
74
See id. at 1128, 1130, 1133 (denying motion of defendant-intervenors seeking to vacate
the judgment on the grounds the presiding judge was or could reasonably appear to be
biased based upon his membership in class of persons who might benefit from the ruling);
see also Maura Dolan, Gay Judge Not Required to Remove Himself from Same-Sex Marriage Case,
U.S. Judge Rules, L.A. TIMES (June 15, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jun/15/
local/la-me-0615-gay-judge-20110616, archived at http://perma.cc/3XX6-SU8T (quoting
Judge Ware on the unreasonableness of the assumption that Judge Walker could not render
an impartial judgment).
75
See Jim Morrison, Op-Ed: Scalia Too Biased to Judge Marriage Cases, ADVOCATE (Dec. 27,
2012, 1:48 PM), http://www.advocate.com/commentary/2012/12/27/scalia-too-biasedjudge-upcoming-marriage-cases, archived at http://perma.cc/Z6GY-8N5N (discussing
reasons for LGBT activists calling for Justice Scalia to recuse himself).
76
See RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION
OF JUDGES 318–22 (2d ed. 2007) (stating that a jurist’s participation in a prior case involving
a party or similar facts or participation in a prior proceeding in the same case, without
more, does not disqualify the jurist).
77
See Morrison, supra note 75 (noting Scalia equated the moral opposition to
homosexuality akin to the moral opposition to murder). But see Erin Fuchs, Here’s Why
Scalia Should NOT Recuse Himself from the Gay Marriage Cases, BUSINESS INSIDER (Dec. 13,
2012, 1:30 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/why-scalia-should-hear-gay-marriage-
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E. A Common Thread in Partiality Problems
In each of these situations, the grounds for the appearance of
partiality (if not an actual or probable partiality problem) are different,
but they all resulted in an initial decision denying disqualification.78
Some scenarios involve the jurist’s financial or other personal interests.79
In other instances, doubts about impartiality are created by the jurist’s
relationships with interested parties.80 In some matters the political
interests or ideology of the jurist may influence the decision.81 In a few
cases, there are even questions of bias for or against a party or
participant based upon their membership of a specific interest group. 82
But, in spite of the variety of circumstances, in each case the initial
decision was to deny the jurist was disqualified.83
This is not to suggest that the jurists were, in fact, partial or even that
if all the facts about the described situations were known that would
raise reasonable doubts in the mind of others to create an appearance of
partiality. Instead, the point is that there is reason to pause and consider
more carefully the questions raised by these disqualification challenges
and the resulting decisions. Such serious reflection reveals one striking
feature of all these disputes—the challenged jurist was the sole (and in
courts of last resort the final) arbiter of his own impartiality.84 Given
what we know about the Bias Blind Spot, this feature of disqualification
decisions requires more attention and should be the focus of recusal
reform efforts. In other words, to properly reform recusal practice, we
must reshape the procedures (and perhaps the substantive standards)
used to decide when disqualification is warranted.

2012-12#!Hmsjc, archived at http://perma.cc/FGU6-R99C (explaining why several SCOTUS
litigators do not believe Justice Scalia is disqualified from hearing the gay marriage cases).
78
See supra notes 26–51 and accompanying text (citing the initial decision not to
disqualify).
79
See supra notes 26–33 and accompanying text (discussing financial and personal
interests in cases).
80
See supra notes 33–37 and accompanying text (explaining that jurist’s impartiality may
be compromised by pre-existing personal relationships with parties vested in the outcome
of the case).
81
See supra notes 37–51 and accompanying text (noting the influence of political interests
or ideologies that could affect a jurist’s impartiality).
82
See supra notes 42–49 and accompanying text (looking at miscellaneous types of
personal bias that fall outside the other categories).
83
See supra notes 26–51 and accompanying text (discussing the tendency to not
disqualify the jurist for bias).
84
See supra notes 26–51 and accompanying text (noting that discretion in the
disqualification decision rested with the jurist in each case).
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III. CURRENT SUBSTANTIVE STANDARDS AND PROCEDURAL PRACTICES LEAD
TO DEFECTIVE “SELF-DISQUALIFICATION” DECISIONS
The current substantive standards and procedural rules, when
mixed with the cognitive illusions of the challenged jurist as decision
maker, create a chancy combination that introduces the risk of systemic
error in disqualification decisions. The substantive standards for
disqualification include actual bias, probable bias, and apparent bias.85
However, the actual bias standard is seldom applied and instead federal
and state court decisions focus on the lesser standards of probable or
apparent bias.86 Both of these standards require the challenged jurist to
use an objective—not subjective—test to determine if sufficient concerns
regarding impartiality exist so as to warrant disqualification.87 In most
instances, the procedural rules permit the challenged jurist to act as the
initial and, in some cases final, arbiter of his own alleged biases.88 This
combination sets up a situation in which the challenged jurist evaluates
his own biases from the perspective of “self” rather than from the
perspective of the reasonable, informed “other” who is the benchmark
for the substantive disqualification standard.89 This practice—which can
See FLAMM, supra note 76, § 5.2, 103–05. Although the early common law did not
permit disqualification for bias (other than in two limited circumstances of pecuniary
interest and certain prior participation in the proceedings), the current substantive
standards applicable to the federal and state courts certainly dictate disqualification of a
jurist who actually is biased.
86
See FLAMM, supra note 76, §§ 5.1–5.2, 103–08. Thus, this Article focuses on how the
Bias Blind Spot affects disqualification decisions using the lesser substantive standards of
probable or apparent bias. See infra Part IV (discussing the chancy combination of objective
standards, self-disqualifying procedures, and the Bias Blind Spot).
87
See FLAMM, supra note 76, at 104 (stating that the current federal disqualification
standard is objective). The term “objective” describes something “existing independent of
thought or an observer” and “belonging to the object of the thought rather than to the
thinking subject[.]” Objective Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, available at http://dictionary.
reference.com/browse/objective?s=t (last visited Nov. 7, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/6XMA-UZTA (emphasis added). In contrast, “subjective” describes
something “existing in the mind [and] belonging to the thinking subject rather than to the
object
of
thought.”
Subjective
Definition,
DICTIONARY.COM,
available
at
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/subjective (last visited Nov. 7, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/6XMA-UZTA (emphasis added).
Thus, as used in this Article,
“subjective” assessments are made based upon internal evidence of the mental state of the
challenged jurist—his feelings, opinions, and thoughts—and “objective” assessments are
made based upon external evidence such as actions and words of the challenged jurist. See
infra Part III.A.3–4 (discussing current federal and state substantive standards for
disqualification).
88
See infra Part III.A.5 and accompanying text (discussing procedural practices in federal
and state courts).
89
See infra Part IV.A and accompanying text (describing how the Bias Blind Spot distorts
disqualification decisions).
85
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be labelled as “self-disqualification”—when combined with the cognitive
illusion known as the Bias Blind Spot, collapses the objective reasonable
person test into a subjective self-assessment without the jurist even
realizing the problem.90 This chancy combination of substantive
standards, procedural practices, and human fallibility introduces
systematic error that results in actually, probably, or apparently biased
jurists deciding cases rather than stepping aside.
A. Current Federal and State Substantive Standards for Disqualification
The substantive standards used by the federal and state courts
require the challenged jurist to use an objective—not subjective—test to
determine if sufficient concerns regarding impartiality exist to warrant
disqualification.91 These substantive standards are drawn from three
types of legal sources: (1) the Due Process Clause of the United States
Constitution and some state constitutions; (2) applicable federal and state
statutes on disqualification; and (3) the relevant federal and state judicial
ethics codes.92 Each of these sources provides for one of three general
disqualification standards: the challenged jurist is disqualified when he
is actually, probably, or apparently biased.93 All three of these tests
require consideration of the circumstances from the perspective of the
reasonable, informed person—an “other” rather than from the “self”
oriented perspective of the challenged jurist.94 Thus, current federal and
state substantive law applicable to disqualification decisions requires the
decision maker to evaluate the evidence of actual, probable, or apparent
bias as an objective “other” would.

90
See Jeffrey M. Hayes, To Recuse or to Refuse: Self-Judging and the Reasonable Person
Problem, 33 J. L. PROF. 85, 96–97 (2008) (labeling this phenomenon as “self-judging”). But,
that is a misnomer because, as the author concedes, the jurist who is the target of the
disqualification motion is not on trial. Id. at 97. Moreover, the jurist has no financial or
other personal interest at stake in the case. Id.
91
See infra notes 123–28 and accompanying text (explaining the objective standard).
92
See Debra L. Bassett & Rex R. Perschbacher, The Elusive Goal of Impartiality, 97 IOWA L.
REV. 181, 189–90 (2011) [hereinafter The Elusive Goal of Impartiality] (discussing sources of
disqualification standards). Of course, these sources do not include State Constitutions,
several of which include their own Due Process Clause. See generally Gabriel D. Serbulea,
Due Process and Judicial Disqualification: The Need for Reform, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 1109, 1151–73
(2011) (explaining the recusal laws of the fifty states and the District of Columbia in the
Appendix).
93
See supra Part III.A.1–3 (discussing the various substantive standards for
disqualification under federal and state constitutions, statutes, and judicial codes of
conduct).
94
See supra Part III (considering the objective nature of the federal and state substantive
standards for disqualification).
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Federal Due Process Clause Demands an Objective Evaluation of
Bias

The first of these substantive standards, the Due Process Clause of
the United States Constitution requires an objective assessment of
whether the jurist is actually or probably biased.95 Historically, SCOTUS
has interpreted the Due Process Clause to require disqualification in two
distinct circumstances: (1) when the jurist has a direct or indirect
pecuniary interest in the case; and (2) when the jurist has a conflict due
to his participation in an earlier proceeding (such as when the judge is
presiding over the trial of a criminal defendant after holding the
defendant in contempt of court).96 More recently SCOTUS held that
there is a third instance in which the Due Process Clause requires that
the challenged jurist step aside.97 In Caperton, a sharply divided SCOTUS
held that disqualification is warranted “when a person with a personal
stake in a particular case had a significant and disproportionate
influence in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing
the judge's election campaign when the case was pending or
imminent.”98 Thus, the Due Process Clause requires a challenged jurist
to recuse in at least three different situations, which the Caperton majority
described as circumstances when “the probability of actual bias on the
part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally
tolerable[.]”99
95
See generally Serbulea, supra note 92, at 1151–72 (listing the state constitutions of
twelve states that include provisions that have been interpreted to require disqualification
of judicial officers who are not impartial). Most of those state constitutional provisions are
due process clauses. Id. at 1110–11, 1162–69. However, a handful of state constitutions—
those adopted in Arkansas, California, Maryland, and Texas—include explicit standards
for judicial disqualification. Id. at 1152–53, 1160, 1169–70. The disqualifying situations
enumerated in these state constitutions are similar, if not identical, to the disqualifying
circumstances set forth in the applicable state statutes or judicial ethics rules. Id.
96
See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 824 (1986) (declaring a judge had a
direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case and should have been disqualified);
Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60–62 (1972) (holding that the village mayor could not act
as a neutral judge over cases that involved village income); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400
U.S. 455, 465–66 (1971) (stating that a judge who becomes embroiled in a heated argument
with the petitioner’s lawyer should not preside over the contempt proceedings); In re
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 137–39 (1955) (stating it was a violation of due process for the
grand jury judge to preside over the subsequent petition); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535
(1927) (stating the defendant had the right to an impartial judge, unmotivated by pecuniary
interests).
97
See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 884–87 (2009) (noting the risk of
bias when a significant campaign contributor influences the election to unseat a judge at
the time they have a case pending before the court).
98
Id. at 884.
99
Id. at 868 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)).
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It is clear from both the language and holding in Caperton that the
“probability of actual bias” standard requires an objective evaluation of
the external evidence of bias in order to comply with Due Process.100
First, Justice Kennedy explains the prior SCOTUS precedents make clear
that “[t]he inquiry is an objective one.”101 Second, the majority opinion
states that actual subjective bias is not required to merit
disqualification—a serious risk of bias is sufficient: “[t]he Court asks not
whether the judge is actually, subjectively biased, but whether the
average judge in his position is ‘likely’ to be neutral, or whether there is
an unconstitutional ‘potential for bias.’”102 Third, the Caperton Court
spells out that the disqualification determination does not depend on the
challenged jurist’s assessment of his own thoughts, opinions, or feelings
but relies on external evidence of how the average jurist would respond
in the circumstances: “the question is whether, ‘under a realistic
appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness,’ the interest
‘poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be
forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately
implemented.’” 103 Thus, the Due Process standard is not concerned with
the internal evidence of actual bias known only to the challenged jurist,
but requires assessment of whether there is a probability of judicial bias
as viewed from an objective perspective held by somebody else—a
reasonable “other.”104
While this guarantee of judicial impartiality means that the Due
Process Clause is exceedingly important in some respects—it is, in
Id. at 872.
Id. at 881.
102
Id. at 881.
103
Caperton, 556 U.S. at 870 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46 (1975)). In the
facts before the Caperton Court, “[t]he inquiry center[ed] on the contribution's relative size
in comparison to the total amount of money contributed to the campaign, the total amount
spent in the election, and the apparent effect such contribution had on the outcome of the
election.” Id. at 884.
104
See id. at 896 (noting the dissent’s concern regarding the ambiguity of the
reasonableness standard used by the majority). One thing that the Caperton majority did
not answer is whether that “other” is “a reasonable [lay]person, a reasonable lawyer, or a
reasonable judge[.]” Id. (Roberts, J., dissenting). Some commentators have posited that the
Due Process Clause, unlike the federal and state statutes and judicial rules, requires the
assessment of probable bias be made by a “reasonable judge” rather than a reasonable
layperson. See, e.g., Raymond J. McKoski, Judicial Disqualification After Caperton v. A.T.
Massey Coal Company: What’s Due Process Got To Do With It?, 63 BAYLOR L. REV. 368, 388–
91 (2011) (stating that the average judge who is skilled in the art of judging is best suited to
determine whether a jurist is likely to be tempted to ignore his oath, training, and
professional obligations when deciding a case); Dmitry Bam, Understanding Caperton:
Judicial Disqualification Under the Due Process Clause, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 65, 75 (2010)
(concluding that the ABA appearance-based disqualification test is administered by a
“member of the public,” while the due process test focuses on the reasonable judge).
100
101
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practice, the least important standard for judicial disqualification. It is
the most important source of judicial disqualification law because the
Due Process Clause embodies an ideal and guarantees “[a] fair trial in a
fair tribunal” to all litigants who appear before any court in the United
States—whether a federal or state tribunal.105 The Fifth Amendment
insures that Due Process is provided in the federal courts and the Due
Process guarantee is made applicable to the state courts through the
Fourteenth Amendment.106 Nevertheless, “[t]he Due Process Clause
demarks only the outer boundaries of judicial disqualifications.
Congress and the states, of course, [already have been and] remain free
to impose more rigorous standards for judicial disqualification than
those we find mandated [by the Due Process Clause].”107 Thus, even
though the Due Process Clause applies to every federal and state court it
seldom will be the basis for disqualification—instead most
disqualification disputes will be resolved by applying other applicable
non-constitutional federal or state laws.
2.

Non-Constitutional Disqualification Law Requires an Objective
Assessment of Bias

The non-constitutional sources of disqualification law vary
somewhat in specific aspects of the substantive test employed, but nearly
all apply an objective standard when assessing judicial bias. While there
may be other mechanisms to remove a jurist, the primary nonconstitutional sources of disqualification law include applicable federal
and state statutes and the rules governing judicial conduct in both
federal and state courts.108 In the federal courts, Title 28 of the United
States Code provides the statutory authority for parties to seek
disqualification of a jurist who actually is biased or appears to be less
than impartial.109 In the state courts, disqualification is also governed, in
part, by statutory law as nearly every state—with only two exceptions—
has adopted a disqualification statute.110 While a substantial minority of
states permits parties to use some form of peremptory challenge to
Caperton, 556 U.S. at 876 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)).
See id. at 872 (stating the analysis is based on the Fourteenth Amendment in this case).
107
Id. at 889–90 (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828 (1986)).
108
See generally FLAMM, supra note 76, at 30–50 (discussing the basis for disqualification
provisions).
109
See generally id. at 669–81 (describing all the amendments that have been made to Title
28 of the United States Code in regard to disqualification provisions).
110
See Serbulea, supra note 92, at 1122 & n.104 (noting that Delaware and New
Hampshire are the two exceptions); see also, FLAMM, supra note 76, at 753 (explaining that
there are statutes, constitutional provisions, or court rules in nearly every state dealing
with judicial disqualification).
105
106
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disqualify a jurist, most state statutes generally require that a jurist step
aside when he is actually biased or his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.111 Given that both federal and state statutes embody an
appearance of impartiality standard, it is not surprising that a challenged
jurist’s actual or potential for bias must be assessed using an objective
standard.
3.

Federal Statutory Substantive Disqualification Standards Apply the
Reasonable Person Test

In the federal courts, that objective assessment can be made under 28
U.S.C. §§ 47, 144, or 455, but section 455 is the statute that, in practice,
governs most federal disqualification disputes.112 Unlike 28 U.S.C. § 455,
sections 47 & 144 of Title 28 are rarely used as the basis for a motion to
disqualify.113 Section 47 has a very narrow focus and disqualifies a judge
only from “hear[ing] or determin[ing] an appeal from the decision of a
case or issue tried by him [previously].”114 Section 144 also is limited in
scope because it applies only to “proceeding[s] in a district court” and
not to any federal appellate court.115 However, section 144 should be
widely used at least in district court because the intent and language of
the statute suggests that Congress intended to provide parties with the
right to use a peremptory challenge to disqualify a trial judge whom the
party believed to be biased or prejudiced.116 Notwithstanding this
language, federal courts have interpreted and applied section 144 in such
a way as to render its provisions virtually meaningless.117 Thus, most
federal court challenges to a jurist’s impartiality that rely upon statutory
law generally are brought under 28 U.S.C. § 455.
In contrast to both section 47 and section 144, section 455 is designed
to apply broadly and, by its terms, governs disqualification in all federal

111
See Serbulea, supra note 92, at 1123 & n.108 (noting that Arizona, Iowa, Louisiana,
Michigan, and South Carolina are the minority of states); see also, FLAMM, supra note 76, at
753 (stating that the most significant difference among state disqualification laws is that
while in a majority of jurisdictions judges may be removed only for cause, a substantial
minority of states permit parties to use peremptory challenges to remove a jurist).
112
See Serbulea, supra note 92, at 1121 (citing to the relevant federal disqualification
statutes).
113
See id. at 1125–26 (providing reasoning as to why sections 47 and 144 of Title 28 are
rarely used).
114
28 U.S.C. § 47 (2006).
115
Id. § 144.
116
See Debra Lyn Bassett, Judicial Disqualification in the Federal Appellate Courts, 87 IOWA L.
REV. 1213, 1223–26 (analyzing Congress’s intended use of the statute).
117
See id. at 1224–25 & n.58 (citing to examples of federal cases).
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courts at both the trial and appellate level.118 Under subpart (a) of
section 455, a federal court jurist “shall disqualify himself in any
proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”119
This standard has been interpreted to require disqualification “when a
reasonable person, knowing the relevant facts” would believe the jurist
may be biased and it does not require a showing of subjective bias.120
This general disqualification standard is augmented in subpart (b) of
section 455 by a list of specific circumstances, which per se constitutes
disqualifying conditions.121 The current language of both parts of section

See CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., 2011 YEAR-END REPORT ON
FEDERAL JUDICIARY 7 (Dec. 31, 2011), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/
publicinfo/year-end/2011year-endreport.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/2PGR-UKQV
[hereinafter 2011 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY] (stating that “the limits of
Congress’s power to require recusal [of SCOTUS Justices] ha[s] never been tested”). In
spite of the clear language used by Congress, SCOTUS has never acknowledged, much less
held, that section 255 applies to disqualification of the Justices of SCOTUS. Id. In fact,
Chief Justice Roberts recently released a Year End Report that suggested Congress may not
have the power to regulate disqualification disputes and other ethical matters involving
SCOTUS. Id. However, section 455 is widely used in the district courts and circuit courts
of appeal. Id.
119
28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2006).
120
See Liljeberg v. Health Serv. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 848 (1988) (holding that if
a reasonable person, knowing the relevant facts as they actually existed, would believe that
the judge should have known of the conflict, then the judge may be retroactively
disqualified under section 455).
121
28 U.S.C. § 455(b) (2006). In fact, section 455(b) mandates that a federal jurist:
[S]hall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or
personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceeding;
(2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in
controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law
served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or
the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning it;
(3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in such
capacity participated as counsel, adviser or material witness
concerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the
merits of the particular case in controversy;
(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or
minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the
subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any
other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the
proceeding;
(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship
to either of them, or the spouse of such a person:
(i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of
a party;
(ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
118

THE
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455 includes the term “shall” to make clear the jurist has no discretion
and must recuse if the conditions set forth in either subpart are met—
regardless of the jurist’s thoughts, feelings, or opinions.122 Thus, both
sections of section 455 provide legal standards that employ an objective
test—not one based upon the jurist’s subjective view—for determining
whether disqualification is required.
4.

State Substantive Disqualification Statutes are Based Upon Objective
Standards

Like the federal statutory scheme, most state disqualification statutes
require application of an objective test to determine if sufficient bias does
or at least appears to exist to warrant the jurist stepping down.
Although a minority of states permit some form of peremptory
challenge, most limit that right to one challenge per party per case, so
any party that desires to disqualify any substituted jurist must meet the
applicable “for cause” standard.123 The disqualification standards
provided in twenty-nine of the statutes adopted in the fifty states can be
broken down into two categories: (1) five states require a showing of
(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be
substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(iv) Is to the judge’s knowledge likely to be a material witness in
the proceeding.
Id.
28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970). Before its amendment in 1974, Section 455 provided for a
subjective test for determining whether disqualification was warranted:
Any justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any
case in which he has a substantial interest, has been of counsel, is or
has been a material witness, or is so related to or connected with any
party or his attorney as to render it improper, in his opinion, for him to
sit on the trial, appeal, or other proceeding therein.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Barry Sullivan, Law and Discretion in Supreme Court Recusals:
A Response to Professor Lubet, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 907, 919–20 (suggesting the possibility that
§ 455 may be unconstitutional as applied, but “it seems unlikely that a majority of the
Justices would want to provoke a constitutional stand-off over the question whether
Congress has the right to insist that the Justices act with the same degree of probity as other
federal judges.”).
123
See Serbulea, supra note 92, at 1122–23 & n.105 (discussing state disqualification
statutes and noting that only seventeen states allow for peremptory disqualification
without cause); see also JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., FAIR COURTS:
SETTING RECUSAL STANDARDS 18 (2008), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/
sites/default/files/legacy/Democracy/Recusal%20Paper_FINAL.pdf,
archived
at
http://www.perma.cc/M2AD-8CSZ (explaining that about one third of the states, a total
of nineteen, permit parties to use peremptory challenges to remove one judge per
proceeding); FLAMM, supra note 76, at 790 (stating that “a substantial minority of mostly
western or mid-western jurisdictions have provisions on the books that permit parties to
seek disqualification on a peremptory basis, without any showing of cause”).
122
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actual bias; and (2) twenty-four states require disqualification upon a
showing of at least an appearance of partiality.124 However, the
statutory law in the remaining twenty-one states is not easily grouped
into a single classification—though all appear to require evidence of
something less than actual bias.125 The “appearance of impropriety” or
“appearance of partiality” test asks the decision maker to evaluate the
evidence of possible bias in the same manner a reasonable [and
informed] “other” would—which requires that he view the external
evidence of possible bias.126 In other words, the majority of state
disqualification statutes that have a clear standard employ an objective
test and do not rely upon the jurist’s subjective thoughts, feelings, or
opinion about his own actual, probable, or apparent bias.
5.

Federal and State Codes of Judicial Conduct Rely on the “Reasonable
Other” Standard to Evaluate Bias

In addition to the statutory grounds for disqualification, federal and
state court judges and justices (with the possible exception of SCOTUS)
are subject to ethical rules that require assessment of judicial bias using
an objective assessment of the external evidence.127 The Code of Conduct
for United States Judges (“Code of Conduct for US Judges”) adopted by the
Judicial Conference of the United States is the touchstone for
determining whether the circumstances create an “appearance of
impropriety” that dictate whether the federal jurist should step aside and
not hear a case.128 The ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct (“ABA Judicial
Code”) provides the benchmark for disqualification in state court
systems, having been adopted in substantial part in at least forty-nine
states.129 It is not clear that either of these ethical codes has the force of
124
See Serbulea, supra note 92, at 1123 & n.108 (noting the five states are Arizona, Iowa,
Louisiana, Michigan, and South Carolina). See generally FLAMM, supra note 76, at 790–822
(listing only eighteen states that permit some form of peremptory challenge that requires
no showing of cause).
125
See Serbulea, supra note 92, at 1123 (recognizing that the law is unclear in the rest of
the states); see also FLAMM, supra note 76, at 104–07 (stating the “appearance of impropriety”
or “appearance of bias” standards are both objective assessments).
126
See FLAMM, supra note 76, at 107 (stating that all states—except Iowa, Louisiana,
Michigan, and Wisconsin—have adopted the “appearance of bias” standard and held it
requires the challenged jurist to step aside “whenever a reasonable person would think [the
jurist] might not be absolutely detached and impartial”).
127
See 2011 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, supra note 118, at 7 (stating
that “the limits of Congress’s power to require recusal [of SCOTUS Justices] have never
been tested”).
128
Bassett, supra note 116, at 1229.
129
See id. (noting adoption of a version of the ABA Judicial Code in all forty-nine states);
Marie McManus Degnan, Note, No Actual Bias Needed: The Intersection of Due Process and
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law—the ABA Judicial Code being merely a model code and there being
some question regarding the statutory authority of the Judicial
Conference to enact binding ethics rules for jurists.130 Nevertheless, the
ethical standards expressed in both the ABA Judicial Code and the Code of
Conduct of US Judges are given great deference by courts when deciding
disqualification disputes.131 Thus, both of these judicial conduct codes
have a significant impact on disqualification decisions throughout the
federal and state court systems.
a.

State Codes of Judicial Conduct Apply an Objective Appearance-Based
Standard

There are two basic scenarios under the ABA Judicial Code that dictate
a jurist must not sit on a case: (1) when he actually is not impartial; or
(2) when it appears to a reasonable person that he might not be
impartial.132 Both standards are set forth in Rule 2.11 of the ABA Judicial
Code, which is the operative provision for judicial disqualification.133 The
first part of Rule 2.11(a) provides that “[a] judge shall disqualify himself
or herself in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might
reasonably be questioned[.]”134 The second part of Rule 2.11(a) includes
six enumerated disqualifying situations that require a jurist to step aside
when:
(1) the judge has a personal bias against a party or
lawyer or the judge has personal knowledge of the
facts of the proceeding;
(2) the judge or his spouse, parent, or child has an
economic interest in the outcome of the litigation;
(3) the judge, his spouse, or his close family member is
a party, trustee or officer to a party, lawyer, a
Statutory Recusal, 83 TEMPLE L. REV. 225, 227 & n.20 (2010) (noting adoption of Rule 2.11 in
substantial part in all fifty states).
130
Bassett, supra note 116, at 1229–30 & n.79. Of course, the ABA Judicial Code, being a
model code does not have the force of law unless and until it is properly adopted in a
jurisdiction. Id. at 1229. The 1972 version of ABA Model Code has been adopted in at least
forty-nine of the fifty states. Id. While some states treat their judicial codes of conduct as
enforceable rules of law other states that have adopted the ABA Judicial Code treat the
standards as guidelines for ethical judicial behavior. Id. at n.79.
131
See id. at 1229 (noting that the states differ with respect to the power of these ethical
rules).
132
See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11 cmt. 1 (2004) (discussing the two
scenarios referenced in the Code).
133
See id. (providing an overview of Rule 2.11).
134
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11 (2004) (reflecting the concept formally
found in Canon 3E).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 49, No. 3 [2015], Art. 10

830

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

material witness, or has an interest substantially
affected by the proceeding;
(4) the judge knows or learns from a timely filed motion
that one of the parties has made campaign
contributions of a certain size and within a specific
time frame;
(5) the judge has made public statements that appear to
commit the judge to an issue in the case; or
(6) the judge previously was involved in the case as a
lawyer, public official, material witness, or presided
over the matter in another court.135
While these six specific situations listed in Rule 2.11(a)(1)–(6) are
intended to “cover most of the situations in which disqualification is
likely to arise,” the enumerated circumstances are not an exhaustive
list.136 In addition, the specific enumerated scenarios are not a substitute
for the general disqualification standard set forth in Rule 2.11, which is
an independent basis for disqualification.137 Thus, there are two
standards under Rule 2.11—the list of per se disqualifying conditions and
the general disqualification standard that is invoked when the facts do
not fit within one of the six per se rules, but the judge’s impartiality
nevertheless might reasonably be questioned.138
While there are two standards embodied within Rule 2.11, the
language of the rule makes clear that if either test is met, the jurist

135
Id. at 19. Not all states have adopted all of the enumerated disqualifying
circumstances. See Degnan, supra note 129, at 227 (noting that all fifty states have adopted
the rule in substantial part). In fact, the rule requiring disqualification based upon
campaign contributions by interested parties has been adopted in only one state. Id. at 228
& n. 27.
136
E. WAYNE THODE, REPORTER’S NOTES TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 60 (1973). The
notes provide that:
Although the specific standards cover most of the situations in which
the disqualification issue will arise, the general standard should not be
overlooked. Any conduct that would lead a reasonable [person]
knowing all the circumstances to the conclusion that the judge’s
“impartiality might reasonably be questioned” is a basis for the judge’s
disqualification.
Id.
137
See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11 cmt. 1 (2007) (“Under this Rule, a judge
is disqualified whenever the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned,
regardless of whether any of the specific provisions of paragraphs (A)(1) through (6)
apply.”).
138
See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11 cmt. 1 (2004) (stating that a jurist is
disqualified “whenever the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, regardless
of whether any of the specific provisions of paragraphs (A)(1) through (6) apply.”).
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“shall” step aside.139 The original version of this rule did not include the
term “shall” but rather indicated that the challenged jurist “should” step
aside in the disqualifying situations.140 This change in language (which
actually was made throughout the ABA Judicial Code) signaled a change
to a mandatory rule—rather than a discretionary standard.141 This
change in the language from “should” to “shall” has been adopted in a
majority of states and, therefore, these provisions are deemed mandatory
in those jurisdictions as well.142 In addition, the majority of states that
had adopted the precursor to Rule 2.11 had already interpreted and
applied the “should disqualify” language to require recusal.143 Thus, in
every state that adopted a standard based upon the ABA Judicial Code, if
either the general standard is met or one of the specific situations exists,
the disqualification decision is not discretionary.
In addition to being mandatory, both the general and specific
standards for disqualification under the ABA Judicial Code require an
objective rather than subjective assessment of the jurist’s impartiality.
The first disqualification standard—when the “judge’s impartiality
might reasonably be questioned”—is evaluated not from the perspective
of the challenged jurist but from the point of view of a reasonable
Likewise, the
person—that hypothetical “other” in the law.144
assessment of judicial impartiality under the second disqualification
standard—the per se rules—requires evaluation of external facts
measured from an objective perspective not the subjective state of mind
of the challenged jurist.145 Moreover, the comments to the ABA Judicial

139
See Leslie W. Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety: Deciding When a Judge’s Impartiality
“Might Reasonably Be Questioned,” 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55, 57–58 (2000) (noting that
“shall” was substituted for “should” when the ABA Judicial Code was amended in 1990).
In 1990, the term “should” was replaced with the currently used “shall” in all the canons
and rules making the provisions of the ABA Judicial Code mandatory. Id. at 58.
140
See id. at 57 (referring to the original version of Rule 2.11).
141
See id. at 58 (discussing the change in the language of Rule 2.11 to include the word
“shall”).
142
See id. at n.13 (noting that of the forty-nine states that have adopted the ABA Judicial
Code only sixteen still use the term “should” in their version of the rules).
143
See id. at 57 n.12 (providing an example of a South Dakota case where “should” was
not mandatory).
144
See Abramson, supra note 139, at 58–59 (explaining that the challenged jurist’s
subjective evaluation of the potentially disqualifying circumstances will differ from the
assessment a reasonable other would make of the same situation).
145
See id. at 59–60 (evaluating individual facts). For example, the decision maker must
evaluate whether the jurist previously played a particular role in the case, if the jurist or a
related person has a known direct or indirect economic interest in the case, or whether the
jurist or related party may be a material witness. See also MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT R. 2.11(A)–(C) (2007) (providing rules for when a judge must disqualify himself
from a proceeding).
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Code make clear the reference point is the reasonable minds of others—
not the challenged jurist: “[t]he test for appearance of impropriety is
whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception that
the judge violated this Code or engaged in other conduct that reflects
adversely on the judge's honesty, impartiality, temperament, or fitness to
serve as a judge.”146 Thus, regardless of whether disqualification is
based upon the six enumerated per se circumstances or the “might
reasonably be questioned” catch-all provision, the evaluation of
partiality under the ABA Judicial Code, which has been adopted in nearly
all the states, embodies an objective standard that relies on external
evidence of bias.
b.

Federal Code of Judicial Conduct Applies a Similar Objective Standard

The standard for judicial disqualification contained in the Code of
Conduct for US Judges is virtually indistinguishable from the standard in
the ABA Judicial Code.147 In fact, the two Codes employ nearly identical
language for both the enumerated situations in which bias is presumed
and the general based disqualification standards.148 There are only two
differences in these two substantive standards for judicial
disqualification.149 First, the Code of Conduct for US Judges does not
include in its listing of enumerated per se disqualifying circumstances
any reference to the jurist’s personal bias or prejudice concerning a
party’s lawyer as is included in Rule 2.11 of the ABA Judicial Code.150
Second, although the Code of Conduct for US Judges requires
disqualification when the jurist and certain related persons have any
“interest[s] that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the
proceeding,” this standard omits the “de minimis” qualifier that is
included in the ABA Judicial Code.151 Otherwise, the language of the two
judicial codes of conduct defining disqualification standards is identical
and these provisions closely correspond to the substantive standards of
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 5 (2007).
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 3C(1)(a) (2009); MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11 (2007).
148
See Bassett, supra note 116, at 1230–32 (describing the similarities between the Code of
Conduct for United States Judges and the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct).
149
See id. at 1231 (stating the two differences in the Codes).
150
Compare CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 3C(1)(a) (2009)
(neglecting to include a detailed reference to personal bias toward a lawyer presenting the
case), with MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11(A)(1) (2011) (including bias toward a
lawyer presenting the case as a disqualifying factor).
151
Compare CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 3C(1)(d)(iii) (2009)
(indicating that an interest must be “substantially affected” by the proceeding’s outcome to
determine bias), with MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11(A)(2)(c) (2011) (stating
that the person’s bias must have more than a “de minimis” effect on the outcome).
146
147
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section 455.152 Given these similarities in language, the Code of Conduct
for US Judges—like the ABA Judicial Code—mandates disqualification of a
jurist when there is objective evidence that the challenged jurist’s
impartiality might reasonably be questioned by an informed “other” or
the per se disqualifying circumstances are present.
The use of an objective test for disqualification is in keeping with the
underlying purposes of the ABA Judicial Code and the Code of Conduct for
US Judges. The ABA Judicial Code emphasizes the importance of ensuring
fairness in the courts by ensuring both actual impartiality and perceived
The appearance of an impartiality standard also
impartiality.153
promotes public confidence in the courts, which is seen as integral to the
proper workings of the judicial system and society as a whole.154
Similarly, the Code of Conduct for US Judges requires judges to avoid the
appearance of impropriety and “to act in a manner that promotes public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.”155 The need
to act appropriately is not limited to when a judge discharges his judicial
duties, rather he must “avoid all impropriety and appearance of
impropriety” throughout his professional and personal life to promote
public confidence in the judiciary.156 Thus, both the ABA Judicial Code
152
See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2012) (governing the conduct of judges and when they should
recuse themselves). Compare CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon
3C(1)(d)(iii) (2009) (containing the same language for disqualification as the Model Code of
Judicial Conduct except it omits the reference to “de minimis” interests), with MODEL CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11(A)(2)(c) (2011) (using the same language for disqualification
as the Code of Conduct for US Judges with the addition of a “de minimis” standard).
153
See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (2011) (“A judge shall uphold and
promote the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.”).
154
See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Preamble (2011) (introducing the role of the
judiciary and the need for impartiality). The Preamble provides:
An independent, fair and impartial judiciary is indispensable to our
system of justice. The United States legal system is based upon the
principle that an independent, impartial, and competent judiciary,
composed of men and women of integrity, will interpret and apply the
law that governs our society. Thus, the judiciary plays a central role in
preserving the principles of justice and the rule of law. Inherent in all
the Rules contained in this Code are the precepts that judges,
individually and collectively, must respect and honor the judicial office
as a public trust and strive to maintain and enhance confidence in the
legal system.
Id.
155
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 3 (2009).
156
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 2 (2009). The Commentary
explains:
Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or
improper conduct by judges. A judge must avoid all impropriety and
appearance of impropriety.
This prohibition applies to both
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and the Code of Conduct for US Judges properly apply an objective test to
determine whether a jurist is not only actually impartial, but has
maintained the appearance of impartiality at all times.
B. Federal and State Substantive Standards Rely on an Objective Assessment
of Bias to Promote Purposes of Impartiality
The substantive standards for judicial disqualification used in the
federal and state courts—whether based upon the Constitution, a statute,
or code of ethics—employ an objective test for determining judicial bias.
Using an objective substantive standard to determine judicial bias makes
sense once we properly understand the primary purposes of
disqualification—actual impartiality to safeguard the litigant’s right to a
fair trial and the appearance of impartiality to promote public confidence
in the courts.157 The use of an objective standard focused on external
evidence of the challenged jurist’s words and deeds in assessing actual,
probable, or apparent bias is necessary. This objective and externally
focused standard is critical to measuring how a reasonable “other”
would view the situation, which is required for the appearance of bias
standard.158 Also, the use of a subjective standard in assessing probable
bias would be improper because we cannot detect non-conscious bias by
examining the internal evidence—the challenged jurist’s thoughts,
feelings and opinions.159 While a subjective standard for determining
actual bias may suffice when the bias is conscious, only an objective
standard can adequately address non-conscious actual bias.160 Thus, the
professional and personal conduct. A judge must expect to be the
subject of constant public scrutiny and accept freely and willingly
restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary
citizen.
Id.
See The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality, supra note 21, at 513–14 (discussing the
primary purposes underlying the rule of impartiality in the context of disqualification as
protecting individual rights to a fair trial in specific cases and creating confidence in the
legal system generally). However, at least one commentator has suggested that Due
Process Clause based disqualification standards need only avoid actual bias and that
concerns regarding the public’s confidence in the courts are overblown and could be
properly addressed by simply requiring jurists to provide adequate explanations of their
reasons for disqualification decisions. See also Sarah M.R. Cravens, In Pursuit of Actual
Justice, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1, 42–43 (2007) (analyzing other proposals).
158
See supra Part III.B (discussing the use of extrospective evidence to assess bias in
others).
159
See infra Part IV.A.3 (discussing the use of introspective evidence to assess bias in self).
160
See Pub. Util. Comm. of D.C. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 466–67 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (finding that the subconscious may lead to biased decision making). The most
notable instance of a jurist stepping down due to actual bias happened when Justice
Frankfurter recused himself from hearing a case challenging the practice of playing the
157
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applicable substantive standard must use an objective standard to
protect litigants’ rights by preventing actually biased jurists from hearing
litigants’ cases and maintain public confidence in the judiciary by
avoiding either the probability of partiality or the appearance of
impartiality.
C. Federal and Most State Courts Use Self-Disqualification
While the federal and state courts use different procedures when
determining disqualification disputes, most of those procedures have
one flaw in common: they allow “self-disqualification.”161 The current
procedures in all federal courts permit the challenged jurist to make the
initial determination of whether he is, probably is, or appears to be
sufficiently biased to warrant disqualification.162 Although most of those
decisions (other than at SCOTUS) are subject to some form of appellate
review, the costs to litigants of pursuing an appeal and the lenient
standard of review makes it unlikely that an incorrect initial decision will
be corrected. The same problems plague the state courts, despite the
availability of limited rights to peremptory challenges in a minority of
states, most state courts use procedures that empower the challenged
jurist to decide disqualification disputes.163 Thus, in both the federal and
state courts most often the challenged jurist is tasked with being
unbiased about his own biases and there is no meaningful appellate
review.
1.

Disqualification Procedures
Statutes, and Ethical Rules

Under

the

Federal

Constitution,

The three sources of the disqualification substantive standards most
often used in federal court—the U.S. Constitution, the applicable federal
radio on public buses because his feelings were “so strongly engaged as a victim of the
practice in controversy” it was better for him “not [to] participate in judicial judgment
upon it.” Id. at 467. Justice Frankfurter further stated his belief that most judges can, given
their judicial “training, professional habits, [and] self-discipline[,]” set aside their feelings
and judge impartially; however, Justice Frankfurter also stated that he worried that his
“unconscious feelings” on the subject were so strong they might operate on a sub-conscious
level and affect the outcome or—at the very least—“unfairly lead others to believe they are
[so] operating.” Id. at 466–67. Thus, he took no part in consideration of the case. Id. at 467.
161
See Hayes, supra note 90, at 96–97 (discussing fact that most federal and state court
procedures permit a challenged jurist to be the judge in his own disqualification cause and
labeling the phenomenon as “self-disqualification”).
162
See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2012) (providing guidance on how jurists should determine
whether their bias will influence a case).
163
See FLAMM, supra note 76, at 753–56 (distinguishing the state court procedures for
disqualification from federal practices).
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disqualification statutes, and the code of conduct that applies to federal
jurists—either require or permit a challenged jurist to make the initial
disqualification decision.164 The Due Process Clause itself does not
specify any procedures for how a disqualification dispute is to be
determined, but SCOTUS has consistently held that it is proper for the
challenged jurist to make the initial disqualification decision.165
Although the language of 28 U.S.C. § 144 appears to provide for a
peremptory disqualification, the statute added procedural hurdles.166
Additionally, the manner in which the statute has been consistently
applied by federal jurists has transformed section 144 into a
discretionary disqualification mechanism and rendered it ineffectual.167
The language of the most frequently used federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455
expressly provides that the challenged jurist shall decide whether the
grounds for disqualification are satisfied.168 Similarly, the Code of
Conduct for U.S. Judges provides a self-enforcing disqualification standard
that leaves the challenged jurist in charge of the disqualification
decision.169 Thus, regardless of the substantive standard used in a
federal court disqualification dispute, the judge or justice who is

See The Elusive Goal of Impartiality, supra note 92, at 196 (discussing sources of federal
disqualification standards).
165
See U.S. CONST. art. V (quoting “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process . . . .”); see, e.g., Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S.
868, 882 (2009) (noting that the challenged state supreme court justice decided all four
disqualification motions filed against him and suggesting that procedure was proper).
“Following accepted principles of our legal tradition respecting the proper performance of
judicial functions, judges often inquire into their subjective motives and purposes in the
ordinary course of deciding a case.” Id. Indeed, the Caperton Court missed the perfect
opportunity to correct this flawed disqualification procedure—but instead chose to focus
on the substance of the decision made by Justice Benjamin who repeatedly failed to
appreciate how the facts applied to the proper objective standard dictated by state law. See
also Marbes, supra note 164, at 269–70 (explaining the reasons Caperton argued to dismiss
Justice Benjamin); Bassett & Perschbacher, supra note 92, at 193 (illustrating the impact of
Caperton on the study of judicial impartiality).
166
See 28 U.S.C. § 144 (2012) (adding procedural requirements including a deadline for
filing an affidavit of facts and a certificate of good faith from counsel).
167
See id. (regulating the bias and prejudice of judges); see also FLAMM, supra note 76, at
695–96 (describing the application of the strict construction of 28 U.S.C. § 144).
168
See 28 U.S.C. § 445(a)–(b) (stating that “(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of
the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might
reasonably be questioned. (b) He shall also disqualify himself in [any of the six enumerated]
circumstances . . . [.]” (emphasis added)).
169
See CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 3(C)(1) (2009) (giving the
judge the power to decide his or her own personal bias). “A judge shall disqualify himself
or herself in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be
questioned, including but not limited to instances in which [one of the six per se
circumstances exist].” Id.
164
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believed to be actually, probably, or apparently biased is empowered to
make that critical decision.
2.

Disqualification Procedures Under the State Constitution, Statutes,
and Ethical Rules

Similarly, in most state court proceedings—whether decided under a
state constitutional provision, statute, or the state analog of the ABA
Model Judicial Code—the challenged jurist is the initial, and in some cases
sole or final, arbiter of whether he is sufficiently impartial to continue
presiding over the case.170 Although the procedures governing who
makes the initial disqualification decision differ from state to state, the
procedural rules applicable to a party’s request that a jurist step aside
falls into one of two basic categories: pre-emptory disqualification or
disqualification for cause.171 In a majority of states, a jurist cannot be
disqualified without cause, either actual bias or an appearance of bias
must be demonstrated.172 A significant minority of states (a total of
eighteen states mostly in the mid-west and west) currently permit the
use of peremptory challenges in some of their courts some of the time.173
However, all eighteen of those states restrict the use of peremptory
challenges in some way—requiring that the motion be “timely” filed, the
movant allege sufficient grounds for removal, and other measures—that
result in the application of a discretionary standard by the challenged
jurist in many cases.174 Even in the handful of states where the preemptory disqualification is essentially automatic, each side of the
litigation (even when there are multiple parties on a side) is limited to
one unconditional peremptory challenge in each case, and all subsequent

See Serbulea, supra note 92, at 1122–23, 1151–73 (detailing the procedures for each state
that allow a judge to make a self-determination regarding bias).
171
See FLAMM, supra note 76, at 25 (noting there are three procedures for removal of a
jurist: (1) voluntary disqualification or recusal; (2) peremptory disqualification; and (3) for
cause disqualification); see also Serbulea, supra note 92, at 1122–23 n.105, (reflecting that
seventeen states use some form of peremptory challenge procedure and the remaining
thirty-three states require a decision on the merits of any disqualification motion).
172
See FLAMM, supra note 76, at 29–30 (highlighting the practices of disqualification in
various states).
173
See id. (demonstrating that some states that permit some form of “without cause”
peremptory disqualification including Alaska, Arizona, California, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, South
Dakota, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming).
174
See id. at 769–70, 772–74 (noting that peremptory challenge statutes or rules typically
require the application to be “timely” made and limiting the right to use such procedures
to one challenge per side per proceeding, as well as imposing other restrictions).
170
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disqualification challenges must demonstrate sufficient cause.175 Thus,
the majority of disqualification decisions in state courts will, at least
initially, be considered by the challenged jurist who is permitted to
exercise considerable discretion over the disqualification decision.
IV. THE CHANCY COMBINATION OF OBJECTIVE STANDARDS, SELFDISQUALIFYING PROCEDURES, AND THE BIAS BLIND SPOT
While each of these aspects of disqualification disputes—the
objective reasonable person standard, the “self-disqualifying”
procedures used in most courts, and the Bias Blind Spot affecting the
decision maker—present unique problems in themselves, the manner in
which all three are combined in current disqualification practice
introduces systemic error affecting a large number of proceedings and
that, in turn, erodes public confidence in the courts.176 Although
ubiquitous in American law, the often used reasonable person standard
is increasingly under scrutiny as both judges and scholars question its
objectivity and reliability.177 Also, the procedures followed in most
federal and state courts that allow challenged jurists to decide
disqualification motions directed at them (so called “selfdisqualification”), especially when coupled with a lack of other
procedural protections, are highly controversial because the practice
leaves litigants vulnerable to the challenged jurist’s subjective and biased
interpretation or application of the disqualification standard.178 These
problems with the current substantive standard and the procedural
practices are exacerbated by the Bias Blind Spot, which often causes the
jurist to be unaware of how his objectivity about his own impartiality is
impaired and causes “others” evaluating the jurist’s recusal decision to
doubt his impartiality.179 Thus, the current substantive standards and
See id. at 769 (indicating that a substantial minority of states use unconditional
peremptory disqualification but limit its use to a single challenge per side in each
proceeding).
176
Portions of this section have been adapted from Melinda Marbes, Refocusing Recusals:
How the Bias Blind Spot Affects Disqualification Disputes and Should Re-shape Recusal Reform,
originally published in 32 ST. LOUIS. PUB. L. REV. 235 (2013), which outlines the argument
that even with the methods employed by the courts to avoid judicial bias, there are still
problems with the methodologies that can affect confidence in the court system.
177
See generally MAYO MORAN, RETHINKING THE REASONABLE PERSON: AN EGALITARIAN
RECONSTRUCTION OF THE OBJECTIVE STANDARD 144–46 (2003) (discussing problems with the
“reasonable person” standard in a gendered, multi-racial, and multi-cultural society).
178
See Hayes, supra note 90, at 100–01 (proposing changes to substantive standards to
avoid “self-judging” in disqualification disputes).
179
See generally Emily Pronin, Perception and Misperception of Bias in Human Judgment, 11
TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 37–41 (2006) (investigating the effects of individual perceptions
on bias and prejudice).
175
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procedural practices exacerbate the Bias Blind Spot, and all three
combined introduce cognitive errors that lead to defective
disqualification decisions affecting substantive outcomes in ways that
are difficult, if not impossible, for the challenged jurist to gauge or
correct.
A. The Bias Blind Spot Distorts Disqualification Decisions
The Bias Blind Spot has three important sources that create a
distorted view of the self-disqualifying jurist’s own impartiality and
cause the jurist’s perception of his own bias to conflict with others’ view
of his impartiality.180 First, the Bias Blind Spot is motivated, at least in
part, by well-documented self-enhancement and self-interest biases,
which color our views of self.181 Second, the Bias Blind Spot is based
upon Naïve Realism, which at its core is the conviction that we perceive
objects and events in the world the way “they really are”—in other
words, objectively—and when others do not perceive things as we do,
then we infer there is something wrong with them.182 Third, the Bias
Blind Spot causes one to assess his own biases based upon introspective
evidence (which seldom reveals any traces of biases at work), but use
extrospective evidence when judging others.183 Finally, these aspects of
the Bias Blind Spot create an asymmetry in perception of biases between
the “self” and “others,” which leads to attributions of improper motives
in making assessments of partiality.184 Thus, the Bias Blind Spot,
especially when combined with the substantive standards and
procedures currently used in most disqualification disputes, causes
jurists to make incorrect or, at least, seemingly incorrect, decisions about
their own impartiality, which ultimately undermines the public
confidence in the judiciary.

180
See id. at 37 (discussing the different sources of cognitive, perceptual, and motivational
biases).
181
Id. at 37–38.
182
See Lee Ross & Andrew Ward, Naïve Realism in Everyday Life: Implications for Social
Conflict and Misunderstanding, STAN. CTR. ON CONFLICT & NEGOTIATION 103, 110–11 (1995)
(explaining the layperson’s social understanding).
183
Emily Pronin & Matthew V. Kugler, Valuing Thoughts, Ignoring Behavior: The
Introspection Illusion as a Source of the Bias Blind Spot, 43 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 565,
570 (2007).
184
See Pronin, supra note 179, at 37, 41 (discussing the differing perceptions of bias
between the self and others); see also Joyce Ehrlinger et al, Peering Into the Bias Blind Spot:
People’s Assessments of Bias in Themselves and Others, 31 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL.
1, 2 (2005) (suggesting self-enhancement motivation and naïve realist cognitive illusions as
among the reasons we rely upon introspection when evaluating our own bias).
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Self-Enhancement and Self-Interest Blind Us to Our Own Biases

The Bias Blind Spot is actuated, at least in part, by two welldocumented egocentric biases: (1) self-enhancement and (2) selfinterest.185 The self-enhancement bias reflects the fact that people are
inclined to see themselves in a positive light, even when they are
presented with objective evidence of their own biases.186 The selfinterest bias results in people either denying the influence of self-interest
on their own behavior or claiming such interests make them more
objective.187 Although we generally acknowledge the existence of the
ego-protecting biases, at least in the abstract, people are blind to the
impact of self-enhancement and self-interest biases on them in specific
instances.188 Moreover, while we are slow to acknowledge the possibility
that we are biased by ego-protection concerns, we are quick to infer such
factors influence others’ decisions and conduct.189 Thus, we are more
likely to view others as improperly influenced by self-enhancement or
self-interest concerns, but are blind to see how the same biases operate to
affect our own decisions and behavior.
a.

Self-Enhancement Concerns Help Create the Bias Blind Spot

We are all susceptible to the self-enhancement bias and often we do
not even realize we are affected by this well-documented bias.190 At least
in the abstract, most people acknowledge the role that the selfenhancement bias plays in human cognition.191 However, we tend to
overlook or downplay the impact it has on our own judgments.192 In
fact, even when people “rate themselves as ‘better than average’ on a
wide range of traits and abilities, most people also claim that their overly
positive self-views are objectively true.”193 Moreover, they hold to their
skewed view of themselves even after they are confronted by the
evidence of the self-enhancement bias that afflicts us all.194 Thus,
people’s judgments of themselves usually are more favorable than

185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194

Pronin, supra note 179, at 37.
Id.
Id. at 37–38.
See id. (providing examples of studies).
See id. (noting that human behavior is often guided by others’ judgments and actions).
Id. at 37.
Pronin, supra note 179, at 37.
Id.
Id. (endnote omitted).
Id.
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objective assessments and people seldom realize their self-assessments
are biased.195
b.

Self-Interest Colors Our View of Our Own Biases

In addition to self-enhancement bias, people unwittingly suffer from
self-interest bias, which also colors their judgment.196 Generally, people
believe self-interests motivate human judgments and actions.197
However, people tend to overestimate the role that self-interest plays in
others’ decisions and to underestimate the impact of self-interest in their
own judgments.198 When people acknowledge that their self-interest
may affect their judgments and actions, they usually believe those selfinterests are particularly enlightening rather than a source of bias.199
Thus, people are more likely to believe that others are motivated by selfinterest and that they themselves are free from distorting self-interested
biases.200
2.

Naïve Realism Distorts Our View of Our Own Biases and Our View
of Others’ Biases

A second major cause of the Bias Blind Spot is Naïve Realism.201
Naïve Realism is the conviction that we perceive objects and events in
the world the way they really are—in other words, objectively—and
when others do not perceive things as we do, we infer there is something
wrong with them.202 As described by the renowned social psychologist
Id.
Id.
197
Pronin, supra note 179, at 37.
198
See id. at 37–38 (indicating that people believe hard work is motivated by external
incentives whereas personal motivation stems from internal incentives).
199
See EMILY PRONIN ET AL., UNDERSTANDING MISUNDERSTANDING:
SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 636, 647 (2002) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING
MISUNDERSTANDING] (recognizing that there are cases where our views and priorities
reflect our unique status or experiences). In such cases:
[W]e are inclined to feel that our particular vantage point (e.g., that of
a devout Christian, the child of an alcoholic, a volunteer at the local
battered women’s shelter, or the CEO of a Fortune 500 company) has
been particularly enlightening. By contrast, we see others’ unique
status or unique experiences as a source of inevitable and
understandable biases that distort their objectivity and lead them to
unwise or unreasonable positions on the relevant issues.
Id.
200
Pronin, supra note 179, at 37.
201
See Ross & Ward, supra note 182, at 110 (explaining Naïve Realism).
202
See id. at 110–11 (providing examples of a layperson’s convictions about subjective
experiences).
195
196
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Lee Ross and his collaborator, Andrew Ward, Naïve Realism is
deceptively simple and is made up of only three essential tenets:
1.
2.
3.

I “see” the world objectively—“as it really is.”
Other reasonable people should “see” the world the way I
do.
If other people don’t “see” the world as I do, then they
aren’t seeing clearly.203

Although we acknowledge, at least in the abstract, the subjectivity of
our perceptions when we look at the world, we assume what we
perceive is an unmediated reality—the objects and events “as they really
are” with no cognitive filters.204 Given this belief in our own objectivity
and a conviction that we are reasonable people, we do not attribute the
difference with the other to something faulty with our perception or
assume that the disagreement simply reflects different choices made by
two reasonable and honest people.205 Instead, when others who have all
the pertinent information do not agree with our view, we attribute
undesirable traits (such as a lack of intelligence) or improper motives (a
lack of impartiality) to make sense of the disagreement.206 Thus, we infer
those others have shortcomings that explain their disagreement with us
rather than concede that there may be something wrong with us or that
our view of “reality” may not be correct.207

203
Id. This syllogism was articulated by Lee Ross and Andrew Ward in their seminal
work on Naïve Realism as follows:
1. That I [perceive] entities and events as they are in objective reality and
that my social attitudes, beliefs, preferences, priorities, and the like
follow from a relatively dispassionate, unbiased, and essentially
“unmediated” apprehension of the information or evidence at hand.
2. That other rational social perceivers generally will share my [worldview,
including my] reactions, behaviors, and opinions—provided that they have
had access to the same information that gave rise to my views, and
provided that they too have processed that information in a reasonably
thoughtful and open-minded fashion.
3. That the failure of [other] individual[s] or group[s] to share my
[worldview] arises from one of three possible sources—[they (a) are not
informed; (b) are irrational; or (c) are not impartial—being biased] by
ideology, self-interest, or some other distorting personal influence.
Id. (emphasis added).
204
Emily Pronin et al, Objectivity in the Eye of the Beholder: Divergent Perceptions of Bias in
Self Versus Others, 111 PSYCHOL. REV. 781, 783 (2004) [hereinafter Objectivity in the Eye of the
Beholder].
205
Id.
206
Id.
207
Id.
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The Illusion of Objectivity

We cannot attribute the others’ disagreement to our faulty
perception because as naïve realists, we suffer from the illusion that our
version of the thing or event in question reflects an objective reality.208
We believe we are objective in spite of the fact that most of us concede, at
least in the abstract, that “reality” is a mixture of sensory stimuli and our
perception of those stimuli.209 This “subjective construal” of reality relies
upon our “own needs, own emotions, own personality, [and] own
previously formed cognitive patterns[]” to create a complete picture.210
In other words, we do not perceive an objective reality, but merely a
mediated version of objective facts that are interpreted through a variety
of cognitive filters.211 Nevertheless, we believe we perceive an objective
“reality” that reasonable others should perceive as well.212
Not only do we construct our version of “reality,” but we are
seemingly unaware that we suffer from this “illusion of objectivity.”213
We are convinced that we are objective about our perceptions of the
objects in the world—the smells, sights, and sounds.214 This illusion of
our objectivity also extends to interpersonal relations and other more
These subjective interpretations of the
complex social events.215
phenomena we encounter affect the way we perceive ourselves, others,
and our situations and, in turn, impact how we interact with others in a
Id.
See Dale W. Griffin & Lee Ross, Subjective Construal, Social Inference, and Human
Misunderstanding, in 24 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 319, 320–21
(Mark P. Zanna ed., 1991) (quoting Jerome Bruner’s famous 1957 statement “that the
perceiver must, in seeking to understand an event, ‘go beyond the information given’”).
210
See id. at 321 (quoting DAVID KRECH & RICHARD S. CRUTCHFIELD, THEORY AND
PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 94 (1948)).
211
See id. (citing to Krech and Crutchfield’s argument that “there are no impartial
‘facts’”).
212
Pronin, supra note 179, at 37.
213
Id.
214
See, e.g., Ross & Ward, supra note 182, at 114 (citing a study designed to test subjective
construal of stimuli—the “Musical Tapping” test). The study volunteers were assigned the
task of either listening to or tapping out songs from twenty-five well-known musical pieces
and the listeners were required to identify the song. Id. The difference in the experience of
musical tappers and listeners seems obvious—seeing it from the vantage point of the
study’s architects—but the differences in perception were not so obvious to the study
participants. Id.
215
See id. at 106–07 (1996) (describing a study that was a variation on the classic
Prisoner’s Dilemma Game in which the object of the game was to win money). The name
of the game was changed to suggest whether the game should be played competitively or
cooperatively. Id. at 106. The results of the experiment reflected that how the game was
labeled and, presumably, the different subjective construals evoked by such labels, had the
most significant impact on how the volunteers behaved—competitively or cooperatively.
Id.
208
209
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variety of complex social settings.216 More importantly, the brain plays
this trick—subjectively construing the stimuli we encounter to create
perceptions of “reality”—without us ever knowing we are doing it.217
Thus, our minds make us believe that we “see” the world objectively,
though what we actually “see” is our subjective construal of what we
perceive.218
b.

The Confirmation Bias and Unwarranted Perseverance of Beliefs

The subjective interpretations we construct are likely to persevere,
even in the face of contradictory evidence, because of the “confirmation
bias.”219 When we assimilate new evidence, we “go beyond the
information [actually] given”—by “fill[ing] in [the] details . . . to give
events coherence and meaning.”220 Of course, we have little reason to
think critically of how we select and process new information because
we start from the naïve premise that we are objective.221 Our illusion of
objectivity, coupled with the way we “fill in the gaps” leads us to accept
with little scrutiny the evidence that is consistent with our existing
perspectives and beliefs.222 On the other hand, we intently scrutinize any
evidence that is inconsistent with our understanding to resolve the
cognitive dissonance such new information creates.223 This process of
“biased assimilation of new information”—the confirmation bias—often
“leads to unwarranted perseverance of beliefs” including an
unwarranted belief in our objectivity.224 Thus, not only does our mind
fool us into thinking we are objective, it fools us into confirming that
belief by selectively relying solely on information that confirms our
belief about our own objectivity.225

216
See Ross & Ward, supra note 182, at 104 (asserting that differences in subjective or
construal “matter” have an impact on everyday life and that social perceivers usually make
“insufficient allowances” for the impact of subjective construal when making inferences or
predictions about others).
217
See supra Part IV.A.2 (discussing people’s unconscious perception of reality).
218
See Ross & Ward, supra note 182, at 110 (comparing the relation between subjective
experience and the event that gave rise to the subjective experience).
219
See Objectivity in the Eye of the Beholder, supra note 204, at 788–89 (analyzing perceived
attitudes and behavior discrepancy in attributions of bias).
220
Ross & Ward, supra note 182, at 118.
221
See Objectivity in the Eye of the Beholder, supra note 204, at 796 (describing several
studies that demonstrate this biased assimilation and the resulting perseverance of
unwarranted beliefs).
222
Id.
223
Id.
224
Id. (citation omitted).
225
Id.
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The Introspection Illusion Confirms Our False Belief That We are
Unbiased

We are able to maintain this false belief in our own objectivity, even
after making an effort to determine whether our beliefs are biased
because of the way we evaluate our own biases.226 This is true because in
assessing our own biases, we rely heavily on introspection.227 In essence,
we search our private thoughts, feelings, motives, and beliefs, rather
than evaluate our own behavior, to detect our own biases.228 This
method of assessing our own biases may confirm our capacity for bias—
at least in the abstract or in past circumstances—but introspection often
results in our detecting no bias in the present instance.229 This
introspective method of assessing bias—using internal evidence—is not
particularly reliable because we have no direct conscious access to “the
cognitive and motivational processes (to say nothing of the underlying
biochemical processes) that influence our perceptions [of reality].”230
Thus, it is not surprising that our introspective analysis seldom reveals
any conscious bias in our behavior or our beliefs.
4.

The Bias Blind Spot Creates Differing Perceptions of Bias in Self and
Bias in Others

While we use introspection to assess our own biases, we evaluate
extrospective evidence when assessing the impartiality of others and this
difference in perspective results in an asymmetry in perceptions of bias
between self and other.231 When we discern bias in others, we mostly
rely upon external evidence—the others’ conduct and our theories of
what constitutes biased behavior.232 Even when we do have access to
others’ thoughts, feelings, beliefs, and conscious motives about their own
biases, we tend to give that introspective evidence little, if any, weight.233
We give others’ introspective accounts of their decisions and conduct

See Pronin & Kugler, supra note 183, at 566 (defining “introspection illusion”).
Id.
228
Id.
229
Id.
230
Emily Pronin et al., The Bias Blind Spot: Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus Others, 28
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 369, 378 (2002) (citations omitted) [hereinafter The Bias
Blind Spot].
231
See Pronin, supra note 179, at 38 (evaluating the difference in perceptions of bias).
232
See Pronin & Kugler, supra note 183, at 566 (discussing the reliance on feelings when
evaluating one’s own biases).
233
See id. at 575 (examining how participants in the study reported attending more to
introspective information than behavioral information for assessing bias in themselves but
not for others).
226
227
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less weight because we believe that such accounts are not objective,
reflect bias, or otherwise are not valuable.234 Thus, we assess our own
biases using introspective evidence and use extrospective data to
evaluate the biases of others and, thereby, create different standards for
self-perception and social perception of bias.
B. Bias Blind Spot Leads to Defective Disqualification Decisions and Corrodes
Confidence in the Judiciary
These biased perceptions of self and misperceptions of bias in others
have important implications for specific judicial disqualification
decisions and public confidence in the judiciary as a whole. First, the
Bias Blind Spot creates biased perceptions of the jurist’s own biases,
which when combined with the current procedural practice of “selfdisqualification” can lead to defective disqualification decisions in
specific cases.235 Second, the Bias Blind Spot causes us to misperceive
bias in others, which misperception—when combined with the current
substantive standards and the practice of self-disqualification—can
corrode public confidence in the judiciary as a whole.236 Given these
problems, we need to reform either the disqualification standards or the
procedural practices currently used by most courts in deciding
disqualification disputes. However, given the current disagreements
about the proper substantive standards for bias-based disqualification,
the most efficient and effective reforms are likely to be changes in the
procedures used in disqualification disputes.
1.

The Bias Blind Spot Leads to Defective Disqualification Decisions

The current procedural practices followed in most state and federal
courts make it nearly impossible for a challenged jurist to avoid making
a defective disqualification decision because the Bias Blind Spot creates
biased perceptions of the jurist’s impartiality without him even knowing
it.237 The common practice in state and federal courts of “selfdisqualification” permits the challenged jurist to determine, at least in

234
See id. at 570, 575–76 (expounding on how participants perceived more bias in others
than they did in themselves).
235
See infra Part III.C (examining how in both state and federal court a challenged jurist
can practice “self-disqualification”).
236
See supra Part IV.B (elaborating on how the Bias Blind Spot causes misperception of
bias in others, and therefore can corrode public confidence in the judiciary system).
237
See supra Part IV.B.1 (analyzing how the Bias Blind Spot leads to defective
disqualification decisions).
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the first instance, if he is actually, probably, or apparently impartial.238
However, the challenged jurist, like the rest of us, suffers from the Bias
Blind Spot—which impairs the challenged jurist’s ability to be an
impartial arbiter of his own impartiality.239 Moreover, the jurist is
unlikely to be aware of the impact of his biases on the disqualification
decision—even after searching his feelings, opinions, and thoughts for
evidence of bias—because the Bias Blind Spot operates on a
nonconscious level, which makes it difficult, if not impossible, to
detect.240 Thus, the current practice of allowing “self-disqualification”
increases the chance a defective disqualification decision will be made
because the challenged jurist suffers from the Bias Blind Spot.
2.

The Bias Blind Spot Causes Reasonable Others to Doubt the SelfDisqualifying Jurist’s Decision

In addition to creating incorrect disqualification decisions, the
challenged jurist’s use of “self-disqualification” procedures coupled with
a self-centered standard to judge his own biases likely will lead to a loss
of public confidence in the courts.
This is another predictable
consequence of the Bias Blind Spot that happens because the challenged
jurist’s subjective perception of his own actual, probable, or apparent
partiality is different from the objective standard that “others”—whether
the litigants, other judges, the public, or the press—are likely to use to
The targeted jurist will use
evaluate the jurist’s partiality.241
introspective evidence—primarily his thoughts, feelings, beliefs, and
conscious motives—to determine if he believes he is actually, probably,
or apparently biased.242 Those “others” will assess the jurist’s bias upon

See supra Part III.C (discussing current procedures used in federal and state
disqualification disputes).
239
See Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 820–21 (2001)
(demonstrating that judges are just as likely to be affected by a number of cognitive
illusions as the ordinary public). Although the myriad of studies demonstrating various
aspects of the Bias Blind Spot did not uses judges, justices, or other judicial officers as
participants, there is no reason to believe jurists are immune from this cognitive illusion.
Id. In fact, when jurists have been tested for other common cognitive illusions the results
are similar to results in other studies. Id.; see also supra notes 117–53 and accompanying text
(discussing the causes and consequences of the Bias Blind Spot).
240
See supra note 234 and accompanying text (explaining the introspection illusion and
unconscious impact of the Bias Blind Spot).
241
See supra Part III.C.4 (addressing the use of different evidence to evaluate bias in self
and others and the related differences in self and social perspectives).
242
See supra Part IV.A (establishing the ways in which the Objectivity Illusion, the
Confirmation Bias, and the Introspection Illusion help create our Bias Blind Spot).
238
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his words and deeds.243 This asymmetry in perception between the selfdisqualifying jurist and those reasonable “others” evaluating his actual,
probable, or apparent bias is likely to cause differences in opinion
regarding the dependability of specific disqualification decisions.244
In addition, the Bias Blind Spot causes “others” to misperceive or at
least perceive differently the challenged jurist’s actual, probable, or
apparent bias.245 This leads “others” to unwittingly be overconfident in
their own assessment of the challenged jurist’s bias and to readily believe
the jurist’s self-assessments are motivated by a lack of proper
information, intelligence, or integrity.246 As a result, the current
substantive standards and “self-disqualifying” procedural practices,
when combined with the cognitive illusions created by the Bias Blind
Spot are likely to undermine the public confidence in the challenged
jurist, the resulting disqualification decision, and the courts generally.
Thus, we should reform recusal practice by reshaping recusal procedures
in specific ways to avoid the distortions caused by the Bias Blind Spot.
V. RESHAPING RECUSAL PROCEDURES TO AVOID THE BIAS BLIND SPOT
In order to counter how the Bias Blind Spot distorts disqualification
decisions, we must either reform the substantive standards or we must
reshape recusal procedures, and doing the latter holds the most promise
for actually achieving recusal reform. The substantive standards for
disqualification could be changed—but currently there is no consensus
on what substantive changes to make and there likely will not be
agreement any time soon.247 This is true, at least in part, because of
disagreements about two fundamental issues: (1) whether jurists should
enjoy a strong presumption of impartiality; and (2) what, if any, interests
(personal, relational, or political) are required to overcome that
presumption.248 So, currently the only realistic option is to reshape the
See supra Part III.C.4 (reiterating the use of introspective evidence to evaluate bias in
self and the use of extrospective evidence to assess bias in others).
244
See supra Part IV.A (providing asymmetries in perceptions of bias).
245
See supra Part IV (analyzing the Bias Blind Spot).
246
See supra Part IV.A.2 (presenting the viewpoint that naïve realism makes us confident
in our objectivity and causes us to make attributions about others who do not share our
view of “reality”).
247
See Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Disqualification Matters. Again., 30 REV. LITIG.
671, 677 (2011) [hereinafter Why Judicial Disqualification Matters] (explaining that there is no
agreement between the legal establishment and the public—or even within each sphere—
regarding what constitutes an appearance of partiality).
248
See id. (discussing the appearances regime). Dean Geyh argues:
Currently, the legal establishment is deeply divided over when it is
reasonable for the presumption of impartiality to yield to the suspicion
that extralegal influences may have compromised the judge's impartial
243
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procedural practices used to decide disqualification disputes. Thus, the
reforms proposed in this Article are focused on procedural changes that
are designed to address the distorting influence of the Bias Blind Spot in
disqualification decisions.
A. Self-Disqualification Must Be Eliminated and Other Procedural Reforms
Must Be Made
Given the mechanisms that contribute to creation of the Bias Blind
Spot, at least three procedural reforms are required.249 First, Part V.A.1
discusses how the challenged jurist must be removed as the sole or final
judge of his own partiality either by adopting peremptory challenges or
requiring a judge, panel of judges, or other neutral decision maker rule
on disqualification motions.250 If the challenged jurist is not eliminated
in one of these ways, then the targeted jurist’s denial of disqualification
must be subject to immediate or interlocutory review using the less
deferential de novo review.251 Next, Part V.A.2 shows how, in order to
make these two reforms worthwhile, all jurists and the parties must
provide meaningful, timely disclosure of possible grounds for conflict or
bias.252 Finally, Part V.A.3 explains the decision to deny any recusal
request must be in writing and provide a thorough application of the
facts to the substantive standard for disqualification.253 If these three
reforms are endorsed and executed, then the Bias Blind Spot can be
corrected and the litigants, press, and public will have a clear vision of
an impartial judiciary.
1.

The Challenged Jurist Must Not Be the Sole or Final Arbiter of His
Own Partiality

The first and most important reform is the removal of the challenged
jurist as the sole or final judge of his own partiality because the best way

judgment. The general public is comparably divided, and between the
legal establishment and the general public, there are still further
divisions. The net effect is that except in extreme or well-settled cases,
consensus on when it is fair or reasonable to doubt the impartiality of a
judge is elusive—we do not know it when we see it.
Id.
See infra Part V.A (evaluating the three reforms this Article proposes).
See infra Part V.A.1 (proposing that a challenged jurist should not be the final arbiter
of his own impartiality).
251
See infra Part V.A.1 (providing alternative repercussions if the challenged jurist is not
removed).
252
See infra Part V.A.2 (analyzing the timely disclosures of challenged jurists).
253
See infra Part V.A.3 (examining the reasons for denying disqualification).
249
250
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for “avoiding bias is to avoid the situations that produce it.”254 First, the
courts or legislatures could adopt the use of a limited number of
peremptory challenges—either with or without factual substantiation.255
Second, the challenged jurist could be removed from the disqualification
decision entirely by referring the decision to another jurist or panel of
neutral decision makers.256 Third, if the circumstances at the court do
not permit either of these reforms, then the challenged jurist may be
permitted to make an initial decision regarding disqualification but
would be removed as the sole or final arbiter by providing for prompt de
novo review by another judge or an en banc panel of the court if the initial
decision by the targeted jurist is to deny disqualification.257 Each of these
modified procedures has clear benefits and some costs as well, which
must be evaluated to determine which solution is best to implement
given the circumstances of each federal or state court.

Daniel Gilbert, I’m O.K., You’re Biased, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/16/opinion/16gilbert.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0,
archived at http://perma.cc/8XV5-DK2. Daniel Gilbert is a Professor of Psychology at
Harvard University who researches and writes about cognitive psychology and is the
author of the New York Times Bestseller “Stumbling on Happiness.” Id.
255
See Louis J. Virelli, The (Un)Constitutionality of Supreme Court Recusal Standards, 2011
WIS. L. REV 1181, 1218 (2011) (arguing that Congressional attempts to define the recusal
standards for SCOTUS violates the constitutional Separation of Powers and offends
federalism principles). It is entirely possible that if the courts do not themselves adopt
some type of procedural solutions that state legislatures or Congress will mandate changes.
See, e.g., Supreme Court Transparency and Disclosure Act of 2011, H.R. 862, 112th Cong.
(2011) (proposing that the U.S. Code of Judicial Conduct be applied to SCOTUS and
expounding on the need to establish certain procedures with respect to the recusal of the
Justices); IA CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2(4)(a)–(b) (2014) (expounding on how judges
must disqualify themselves when certain campaign contributions are made); OK CODE OF
JUD. CONDUCT Canon 1 cmt. 5 (2014) (elaborating on the test for the appearance of
impropriety by a judge); UT CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2 (2014) (discussing rules that
govern the judge’s appoint of lawyers to administrative positions, especially relating to
campaigns). However, whether any attempts to legislate in the area of judicial ethics and
recusals would be valid exercises of legislative authority or otherwise effective remains to
be seen.
256
See Virelli, supra note 255, at 1221 (discussing ways in which a challenged jurist can be
removed); see also Steven Lubet & Clare Diegel, Stonewalling, Leaks, and Counter-Leaks:
SCOTUS Ethics in the Wake of NFIB v. Sebelius, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 883, 905 (concluding that
“[n]o individual can have a clear perspective on his or her own impartiality, and decisions
would therefore be better made by objective colleagues”); Sullivan, supra note 122, at 916
(“Just as there is no recognized exception to the hearsay rule for ‘really important hearsay,’
there can be no exception to the requirement of judicial impartiality based on the fact that a
particular Justice believes that he or she has a unique perspective and contribution to make
to the decision of a case, even if his or her colleagues agree that the Justice’s participation is
desirable or ‘really needed.’”).
257
See id. (assessing the approaches that could occur if a challenged jurist denies
disqualification).
254
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This idea of requiring that the challenged jurist step aside certainly is
not new and may even seem obvious—at least those who do not sit on
the bench and make disqualification decisions.258 In fact, in recent years,
a growing number of academics have called for this precise type of
procedural reform.259 Also, some commentators who have questioned
the practice of “self-disqualification” have even derisively referred to the
custom.260 These criticisms have not been limited to a handful of legal
academics—but, instead, are part of an increasingly bitter public
dialogue surrounding disqualification decisions in high profile cases and
the debate about recusal reform.261 In fact, “one of the most criticized
See Note, Disqualification of a Judge on Grounds of Bias, 41 HARV. L. REV. 78, 81 (1927) (“A
biased mind rarely realizes its own imperfection and would normally prevent that perfect
equipoise so desirable in our system of trial.”); Jeffrey W. Stempel, In Praise of Procedurally
Centered Judicial Disqualification—and a Stronger Conception of the Appearance Standard: Better
Acknowledging and Adjusting to Cognitive Bias, Spoliation, and Perceptual Realities, 30 REV.
LITIG. 733, 794 (2011) (arguing why recusal motions should be heard by independent
judges). Professor Stempel writes:
The solution is obvious: recusal motions should be heard and decided,
even in first instance, by another trial judge in the relevant district.
Where a challenge targets an appellate judge, it should be heard and
decided by other members of the panel or, if necessary, by the court as
a whole. Where the challenge targets a United States Supreme Court
Justice or a judge or justice of any other jurisdiction's highest court, the
disqualification decision should be made by the entire court.
Id. Of course, the suggestion that this proposed solution is obvious may—itself—be a naïve
realist expression of the “objective” reality perceived by those who believe this procedural
reform is the reasonable answer.
259
See, e.g., Amanda Frost, Keeping Up Appearances: A Process-Oriented Approach to Judicial
Recusal, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 531, 584 (2005) (arguing that having neutral judges make the
disqualification decision will create greater confidence in the judicial process); Why Judicial
Disqualification Matters, supra note 247, at 693–94 (suggesting that given the lack of
consensus on substantive disqualification standards, procedural reforms are needed);
Stempel, supra note 258, at 804–05 (arguing that disqualification decisions made by the
challenged jurist are suspect given a host of biasing influences and a professional culture
that creates reluctant recusants); ADAM SKAGGS & ANDREW SILVER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUSTICE, PROMOTING FAIR AND IMPARTIAL COURTS THROUGH RECUSAL REFORM 9, 10 (Aug.
2011), available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/09c926c04c9eed5290_e4m6iv2v0.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/HJ8C-VRM8 (discussing eleven separate recusal reforms, including use of
peremptory challenges to jurists).
260
See, e.g., Bassett & Perschbacher, supra note 92, at 197 (referring to Justice Benjamin’s
opinion rejecting any consideration of “appearances” of impropriety); Ross E. Davies, The
Reluctant Recusants: Two Parables of Supreme Judicial Disqualification, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 79, 79
(2006) (labeling the practice of permitting a jurist to judge his own biases as ironic); John
Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 237, 244 (1987)
(suggesting that allowing the challenged jurist to decide the disqualification dispute is
inappropriate).
261
See Marbes, supra note 164, at 264 (examining how the Bias Blind Spot creates a bias
conflict spiral that has affected specific cases and is impacting the debate about recusal
reform within the academe and the larger legal community); see also Laurel A. Rigertas, The
258
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features of recusal practice is the fact that in many states [and at the
Supreme Court of the United States], the judge subject to a recusal
request has the unreviewable last word on whether to step aside from a
case.”262 These criticisms often are based on nothing more than common
sense.263 However, social science studies regarding institutional
legitimacy of the courts have indicated that procedural fairness is an
important factor in public confidence and adherence to court decisions,
even unpopular outcomes.264 Thus, it seems likely that implementing
this single procedural safeguard—eliminating “self-disqualification”—
would go a long way toward addressing much of the criticism of current
disqualification practices in specific cases and restoring public
confidence in the judiciary as a whole.
a.

“Self-Disqualification” Must Be Eliminated

The challenged jurist must be removed as the sole or final judge of
his own partiality—this is the only sure way to avoid the impact of the
Bias Blind Spot on disqualification decisions. The targeted jurist must be
taken out of the decision making process because the jurist cannot be
unbiased about his own actual, probable, or apparent biases.265 This goal
can best be accomplished by either: (1) giving litigants the right to use
peremptory challenges to disqualify actually, probably, or apparently

Supreme Court and Recusals: A Response to Professor Lubet, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 939, 945
(suggesting that a proposal requiring the remaining eight Supreme Court Justices to review
the recusal of a fellow Justice “raise[s] some concerns about whether the public would
construe such a review process as a way for a group of Justices to exclude a Justice for the
purpose of pursuing a perceived partisan agenda”).
262
See SKAGGS & SILVER, supra note 259, at 3 (“It flies in the face of fundamental notions of
disinterested, impartial decision-making to allow a judge accused of bias to be the only one
who decides whether he or she should be disqualified.”).
263
See Disqualification of a Judge on the Ground of Bias, supra note 258, at 81 (“A biased mind
rarely realizes its own imperfection that would normally prevent the perfect equipoise that
is so desirable in our system of trial.”).
264
See Tom R. Tyler & Kenneth Rasinski, Procedural Justice, Institutional Legitimacy, and the
Acceptance of Unpopular U.S. Supreme Court Decisions: A Reply to Gibson, 25 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 621, 626–27 (1991) (finding that “the legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court is based [at
least indirectly] on the [public’s] belief that [the court] makes decisions in fair ways, not on
agreement with its decisions”). But see James L. Gibson, Institutional Legitimacy, Procedural
Justice, and Compliance with Supreme Court Decisions: A Question of Causality, 25 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 631, 631 (1991) (finding a lack of evidence of direct causal link between perceptions of
procedural fairness and the public’s willingness to comply with unpopular SCOTUS
decisions).
265
See supra Part IV (discussing the chancy combination of objective standards, selfdisqualifying procedures, and the Bias Blind Spot).
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partial jurists; or (2) requiring a judge, panel of judges, or other neutral
decision maker to rule on disqualification motions.266
While these proposed reforms will require adjustments to how
disqualification decisions are administered, those changes are both
possible and positive. In fact, several state courts already use either
peremptory challenges or neutral decision makers for disqualification
disputes and those systems are mostly successful.267 Thus, the federal
and remaining state courts should end the practice of “selfdisqualification” and adopt one of these alternative procedures in order
to avoid defective or seemingly defective disqualification decisions
caused by the Bias Blind Spot.
b.

Denial of Self-Disqualification Decisions Must Be Reviewed Promptly and
De Novo

If the removal of the challenged jurist as arbiter of his own
disqualification is not practicable, then his decision must be subject to a
right of immediate appeal using the less deferential de novo standard of
review. It is possible that some courts—especially those with only one
jurist who regularly sits—or a court that is geographically remote cannot
practically implement the preferred reforms—using peremptory
challenges or eliminating self-disqualification. In those jurisdictions
where the challenged jurist is the only person who can make the initial
decision, an immediate right of appeal using the less deferential de novo
standard of review must be provided to preserve litigants’ rights to a fair
trial and preserve public confidence in the judiciary.
Currently, there are few, if any, realistic avenues for review of a
decision denying disqualification—even one decided by the challenged
jurist himself. Although the disappointed party can seek reconsideration
of the order denying disqualification, courts are very reluctant to grant
relief where self-disqualification procedures are used.268 The remaining
methods of review are: (1) right of appeal from final order; (2)
See supra Part V.A (reshaping recusal procedures to avoid the Bias Blind Spot).
See FLAMM, supra note 76, at 505–07 (indicating that while most states require the
challenged jurist to decide, at least initially, a number of states either use peremptory
challenges or permit or require that another judge or panel of jurists decide disqualification
disputes). But cf. Order Repealing Rule 21.1(a) of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal
Procedure & Order Amending Rule 40.1 of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, In the
Matter of the Repeal of Rule 21.1(a) of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure &
Amendment of Rule 40.1 of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure (Nov. 26, 2013)
(repealing the rule permitting peremptory challenges in criminal and juvenile cases due to
blanket uses and other abuses but continuing to permit such challenges in civil cases).
268
See FLAMM, supra note 76, at 960 (noting that courts are “typically quite reluctant to
grant a motion seeking reconsideration of a disqualification order[]” (footnote omitted)).
266
267
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interlocutory appeal of order that is certified as final and reviewable; (3)
immediate review under the collateral order doctrine; or (4) an
extraordinary writ.269 However, there are serious roadblocks along the
way for each of these potential routes for review. First, a disqualification
decision is unlikely to resolve the underlying case and, therefore, the
final order rule will block review through the right of direct appeal.270
Second, a “self-disqualification” order is unlikely to be reviewed using
an interlocutory appeal because those procedures typically require the
jurist whose order is being appealed to certify that the order is a “final
judgment” and that “there is no just reason for delay”—something that is
unlikely to happen.271 Third, immediate review under the collateral
order doctrine will most likely not be available because it requires that
the challenged jurist agree the decision he just made about his lack of
bias is a reasonably close question about “which there is substantial
ground for a difference of opinion.”272 Fourth, the writs of mandamus or
prohibition are extraordinary remedies that will be successful only if the
party seeking relief can meet the high standard of demonstrating the
disqualification decision was a clear abuse of discretion—in other words,
so far out of bounds as to be unreasonable.273 Thus, without an express
right of immediate appeal, most orders denying disqualification are not
subject to meaningful review, even though the challenged jurist was the
arbiter of his own partiality.
In addition, the current standard of review used by most federal and
state trial courts to decide disqualification disputes is too deferential
given the importance of the right to fair trial that is at stake. Most
federal and state court disqualification decisions are reviewed using an
“abuse of discretion”—rather than the de novo—standard.274 It is true
that the standards of review are somewhat difficult to rank because the
269
See id. at 959–68 (exploring these various routes for appellate review and concluding
that few requests for review are likely to be successful).
270
See id. at 959–63 (outlining the different routes for appellate review of disqualification
decisions and finding relief on appeal unlikely); see also Stempel, supra note 258, at 797–98
(finding a right of direct appeal from disqualification decisions generally does not exist).
271
See FLAMM, supra note 76, at 959–61 (discussing appellate review of disqualification
decisions); see also Stempel, supra note 258, at 797 & n.195 (finding it unlikely courts will
certify interlocutory appeals from disqualification decisions given the standards).
272
Stempel, supra note 258, at 798; see FLAMM, supra note 76, at 963–64 (noting that a party
who is aggrieved by a disqualification decision can attempt to invoke the collateral order
exception).
273
See FLAMM, supra note 76, at 967–68 (pointing out that appellate courts have been
reluctant to issue writs of mandamus); see also Stempel, supra note 258, at 797–98 (finding it
unlikely the challenged jurist will certify interlocutory appeals from disqualification
decisions because he would have to concede he may be or appear to be biased).
274
See FLAMM, supra note 76, at 984–86 (stating that “abuse of discretion” is the
predominant standard of appellate review of disqualification decisions).
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abuse of discretion standard focuses on the decision maker, and de novo
review is undertaken from the perspective of the appellate court.275
However, the abuse of discretion standard is too deferential when
applied to “self-disqualification” decisions because the review standard
is based upon two incorrect premises. First, the abuse of discretion
standard improperly presumes that disqualification is a matter of
judicial discretion rather than a mandatory rule that protects the
litigant’s fundamental right to a fair trial.276 Second, use of the abuse of
discretion standard does not properly account for the Bias Blind Spot
because the standard improperly presumes the correctness of the initial
self-disqualification decision.277 Thus, a more rigorous appellate review
using a de novo standard is needed to protect the litigant’s right to a fair
trial and ameliorate the effect of the Bias Blind Spot in disqualification
disputes.
2.

Meaningful and Timely Disclosure of Interests and Relationships
Must Be Made

Second, in order to make these two reforms regarding who will be
the sole or final arbiter in disqualification disputes worthwhile, all jurists
and the parties must provide meaningful and timely disclosure of
possible grounds for conflict or bias. It is true that under most federal
and state judicial ethics codes jurists are required to make financial
disclosure of gifts and other things of value received by the jurist.278
However, the Code of Conduct for US Judges—which applies to all district
court judges and justices on the courts of appeals—does not expressly
require the jurist to disclose known connections with the parties in the
275
See id. at 996–97 (providing that under the de novo standard, the reviewing court
“approaches the task as if it were the first judicial body to consider the matter”). By
contrast, use of the abuse of discretion standard means an erroneous disqualification
decision would be reversed only if the appellate court found that the “decision is one that
can[not] be rationally defended.” Id. at 990.
276
See Serbulea, supra note 92, at 1138 (suggesting that the loss of impartiality infringes
on the due process guarantee of a fair trial); see also Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556
U.S. 868, 876 (2009) (“It is axiomatic that ‘[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic
requirement of due process.’”).
277
See Marbes, supra note 164, at 250–51 (describing the Bias Blind Spot, “which is the
tendency to fail to discern one’s own biases while at the same time inferring bias in others”
(footnote omitted)).
278
See CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 4H(3) (2009) (“A judge
should make required financial disclosures, including disclosures of gifts and other things
of value, in compliance with applicable statutes and Judicial Conference regulations and
directives.”); see also ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 3.15 (2011) (requiring that
a judge must “publically report the amount or value of: (1) compensation received for
extrajudicial activities . . . ”).
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litigation.279 Some courts have gone so far as to suggest it is the litigants’
burden to ferret out such information.280 Even in jurisdictions where
jurists have an affirmative obligation to disclose information relevant to
disqualification, that duty often is limited to only those connections or
interests that the challenge jurist believes are possibly or likely
disqualifying.281 Thus, there is currently a lack of meaningful obligation
to disclose possible disqualifying interests or connections.
This lack of a consequential judicial disclosure obligation means that
most litigants lack necessary factual information to easily evaluate the
actual, probable, or apparent bias of the jurist. This lack of information
forces the litigant who believes the jurist may be biased to make one of
two difficult choices. First, the litigant can expend significant resources
investigating the financial, familial, and other connections of the jurist.282
Second, if the rumored information is serious enough, a party must take
the risk of making a disqualification motion based upon information and
belief and requesting the challenged jurist to disclose the suspected
connections.283 Alternatively, those litigants who lack the resources or
are not comfortable taking the risk of calling out the jurist actually may
be denied a right to a fair trial, or the party, and public, may perceive
such rights has been denied because the decision maker is actually,
probably, or apparently biased.284 Thus, the procedures governing
disqualification disputes must be reformed to include an explicit
obligation on part of jurists to reveal all interests and connections so that
See generally CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 3 (2009) (omitting
language requiring that a judge must disclose a connection to the parties in litigation before
them).
280
See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. The Limited, Inc., 179 F.R.D. 541, 546
(S.D. OH 1997) (“[l]itigants have a duty to investigate and inform the court of any
perceived biases before the court and the parties invest time and expense in a case”), rev’d,
190 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 1999).
281
See, e.g., Porter v. Singletary, 49 F.3d 1483, 1489 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that under
Florida’s judicial ethics code judges have an ethical duty to “disclose on the record
information which the judge believes the parties or their lawyers might consider relevant to
the question of disqualification”).
282
See, e.g., Motion of Respondent Corporations for Disqualification of Justice Benjamin,
reprinted in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 app. at 104a–320a (2009) (No.
08-22), and Hugh M. Caperton’s Motion for Disqualification Directed to Justice Brent D.
Benjamin, reprinted in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 app. at 321a–35a
(2009) (No. 08-22) (describing information gathered in the investigation of Justice
Benjamin’s financial connections with Massey and its CEO Blankenship).
283
See Hugh M. Caperton’s Motion for Disqualification Directed to Justice Elliott E.
Maynard, A.T. Massey Coal Co. v. Caperton, No. 33350 (W.Va. 2008) (seeking judicial
disclosure of rumored connections between the challenged Justice Maynard and Massey
CEO Blankenship).
284
See Frost, supra note 259, at 568–69 (noting that lack of information and its impact on
the likelihood that a disqualification motion will even be filed).
279
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others—the litigants, other judges, the public, or the press—may
evaluate the actual, probable, or apparent bias of the jurist. 285
3.

Decisions Denying Disqualification Must Include Reasons and Be in
Writing and Published

Third, in order to be legitimate, the decision to deny any recusal
request must be a “reasoned decision” that is in writing and made
available to the public.286 Although scholars may not agree on why
procedural protections legitimize judicial decision making, most do
agree on the specific procedures that are essential to legitimate
judging.287 Among those essential procedures is the requirement of a
“reasoned decision”—a decision for which an articulated rationale has
been given—which reason is situated within and constrained by
precedent or another identifiable body of law.288 The legitimizing
function of the reasoned decision is bolstered by the requirement that the
decision must be in writing and made available to the public.289 These
procedures will not only legitimize the specific disqualification decision,
but will help create an entire body of law on disqualification that will
guide future disputes and legitimize the judiciary as a whole.
The practice of articulating a rationale for a decision is the hallmark
of legitimate judging because giving reasons commits and constrains
decision-making both with respect to the current decision and future
disputes. The rationale commits the decision maker to a broader
principle because the reasons given for a specific decision creates a more
abstract or general rule that goes beyond the concrete and specific

285
See supra note 279 and accompanying text (providing that the current ethical rules
governing most jurists, the ABA Judicial Code of Conduct and U.S. Code of Judicial Conduct,
already include disclosure requirements for financial interests and gifts, but do not address
disclosure of other possible conflicts or grounds of bias in specific cases).
286
See Frost, supra note 259, at 592 (suggesting that producing a reasoned decision is vital
to maintaining the integrity of the judiciary).
287
See id. at 555–56 (pointing out that although the sources of judicial legitimacy is
contested, most agree on “several essential procedural components of adjudication that
legitimize it as a method of decisionmaking in a democratic society”).
288
Id. Listing the five essential procedures for legitimate adjudication as:
(1) litigants, not courts, initiate disputes; (2) the disputes are presented
through an adversarial system in which two or more competing parties
give their conflicting views; (3) a rationale must be given for decisions;
(4) decisions must refer to, and be restricted by, an identifiable body of
law; and (5) the decision maker must be impartial.
Id. (footnote omitted).
289
See id. at 562 (citing that public declarations are an additional legitimizing procedure
or feature of judicial decision making).
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context of the current dispute.290 Also, giving reasons constrains the
current decision by situating the outcome within an existing and
identifiable body of law or requiring the decision maker to acknowledge
a new rule is being created.291 In addition, the requirement of stating the
rationale for a decision also promotes discipline in decision making by
making it less likely decisions will be based upon bias, self-interest, or
intuitive judgments rather than thoughtful reflection, which is
particularly important given the effects of the Bias Blind Spot.292
The additional requirement that specific reasons be given in a
writing made available to the public helps bolster legitimacy of the
specific decision, while at the same time, it helps creates a more general
body of law on disqualification.293 The articulation of proper reasons for
a decision is the best way to communicate with others regarding the
decision-making process and legitimize the outcome.294 In fact, it is only
through a reasoned decision that jurists can express that the parties’
participation has been meaningful, the jurist heard and understood the
litigants’ proof and arguments, and the decision reached is not arbitrary,
capricious or otherwise illegitimate.295 Also, the requirement of a written
decision aids review of the grounds for the decision—not just by the
litigants, the press, and the public—but, also by the appellate court.296
Thus, requiring reasons for denying disqualification will help insure that
such decisions are based on rational and legitimate grounds and aid
review of those decisions when necessary.

See Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 641 (1995) (“The key point,
indeed the linchpin for the entire analysis, is that, ordinarily, to provide a reason for a decision
is to include that decision within a principle of greater generality than the decision itself.” (footnote
omitted)).
291
See id. at 652 (explaining that if a jurist cannot articulate reasons for the decision, then
either the result is not constrained by pre-existing law or there is relevance to some
principle from which a new rule can be fashioned).
292
See id. at 657–58 (“A reason-giving mandate will also drive out illegitimate reasons
when they are the only plausible explanation for particular outcomes.”).
293
See id. at 638 (noting that a judge is expected to provide, “ordinarily in writing,” the
reasoning for his or her conclusion).
294
See id. at 657–58 (concluding that giving reasons may be a sign of respect for those
affected by the decision and is also a way of opening a conversation to help insure
participants feel included in the process).
295
See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 388 (1978)
(examining whether an arbiter can rest his decision on grounds that are not argued by the
parties).
296
See Frost, supra note 259, at 563 (providing that the federal court system requires
reasoned decision making so that the appellate courts can review the lower court’s
findings).
290
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B. Criticisms and Misplaced Confidence in Jurists’ Impartiality Should Not
Stand in the Way of Recusal Reforms
In spite of the genuine concerns for impartiality and clear calls for
procedural reform of recusal practices—the practice of allowing one to
“be a judge in his own [disqualification] case” still prevails in the
majority of federal and state courts.297 This is due, at least in part, to
resistance by judges and justices to the idea that the challenged jurist
should be removed from the disqualification decision making process.298
The reasons given are somewhat varied, but can be reduced to four that
require a response. First, critics point to the opportunities for judge
shopping that are inherent in any disqualification system.299 Second,
concerns are sometimes expressed regarding the administrative burden
of such procedural reforms.300 Third, another roadblock to reform is the
perceived loss of public confidence that allegedly will result from an
increase in challenges to jurists’ impartiality.301
Fourth, many
commentators and jurists continue to believe strongly that judges or
justices are capable because of their integrity, experience, and intellect to

297
See supra Part III.C (discussing federal and state disqualification procedures); see also
FLAMM, supra note 76, at 516 (noting that a litigant can seek judicial disqualification or
argue the failure of a judge to recuse himself “as a grounds for error on appeal.” (footnote
omitted)).
298
See Geyh, supra note 247, at 701–02 (explaining the “vicious cycle” of judicial
resistance, recusal reform, and repeated resistance by the bench).
299
See, e.g., Glassroth v. Moore, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1286 (M.D. Ala. 2002) (“The
Eleventh Circuit has articulated an additional important principle to be considered in
recusal cases: although the duty to recuse is imperative in close cases, ‘[j]udges must not
recuse themselves for imaginary reasons; judge shopping should not be encouraged.’”); see
also Bassett, supra note 116, at 1254 (arguing that proponents to peremptory challenges have
raised concerns about judge shopping); Seth E. Bloom, Note, Judicial Bias and Financial
Interest as Grounds for Disqualification of Federal Judges, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 662, 665
(1985) (“Disqualification law must avoid excessive removal of judges, which may do
serious harm to public confidence and judicial efficiency and promote judge shopping.”).
300
See In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 688 F.2d 1297, 1313 (9th Cir. 1982) (demonstrating the
inefficiency of recusal when “after five years of litigation, a multi-million dollar lawsuit of
major national importance, with over 200,000 class plaintiffs, grinds to a halt over Mrs.
Muecke’s $29.70”).
301
See, e.g., Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 903 (2009) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the decision will have the opposite effect and will reinforce
negative public perception of the judiciary). Justice Scalia argues:
What above all else is eroding public confidence in the Nation’s
judicial system is the perception that litigation is just a game, that the
party with the most resourceful lawyer can play it to win, that our
seemingly interminable legal proceedings are wonderfully selfperpetuating but incapable of delivering real-world justice.
Id.
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make the right decision when their impartiality is challenged.302 Finally,
others point to the availability of appellate review as a check on incorrect
disqualification decisions.303 However, not one of these concerns should
stand in the way of reform of recusal procedures because the price paid
by individual litigants’ loss of the right to a fair trial and the resulting
damage to the reputation of our judiciary is simply too great to ignore.
1.

Judge Shopping Likely Will Decrease when Challenged Jurists No
Longer Decide Disqualification

First, when procedural reforms such as eliminating the challenged
jurist from the disqualification decision are suggested, critics often argue
such changes would increase judge shopping. This criticism is usually
leveled against calls to adopt peremptory challenges in disqualification
disputes. However, in states where peremptory challenges (either with
or without cause) are already used, there is little empirical evidence
supporting the conclusion that such methods increase judge shopping.304
In addition, this Article proposes that each jurisdiction decide which of
several methods of decision making to adopt, so long as the challenged
jurist is not the real decision maker.305 Thus, concerns about judge
shopping are misplaced in this instance because courts are free to select a
method that requires litigants seeking to use disqualification to judge
shop to prove to another judge or justice that the challenged jurist lacks
impartiality. Most jurists are more reluctant to decide a colleague is

302
See, e.g., 2011 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, supra note 118, at 10
(discussing recusal). Chief Justice Roberts states:
I have complete confidence in the capability of my colleagues to
determine when recusal is warranted. They are jurists of exceptional
integrity and experience whose character and fitness have been
examined through a rigorous appointment and confirmation process. I
know that they each give careful consideration to any recusal
questions that arise in the course of their judicial duties. We are all
deeply committed to the common interest in preserving the Court’s
vital role as an impartial tribunal governed by the rule of law.
Id.
303
See Stempel, supra note 258, at 753–54 (addressing the argument that appellate review
of potentially erroneous disqualification decisions is available and finding such review
lacking).
304
See ALAN J. CHASET, DISQUALIFICATION OF FEDERAL JUDGES BY PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGE, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER 26–27 (1981) (“Several of the state statutes have
been in place for a long time, but little has been written about them or their operation:
there appears to be only one empirical study that is sufficiently thorough to be useful.”
(footnote omitted))
305
See infra Part V.B (discussing the criticisms surrounding jurists’ impartiality).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol49/iss3/10

Marbes: Reshaping Recusal Procedures: Eliminating Decisionmaker Bias and

2015]

Reshaping Recusal Procedures

861

disqualified than to recuse themselves.306 So, it is unlikely that
eliminating self-disqualification will lead to increased opportunities for
judge shopping. In fact, the opposite result—a decrease in judge
shopping—is the more likely result of this proposed procedural reform.
2.

Administrative Burdens Are Outweighed By the Benefits of Recusal
Reform

Second, the administrative burdens of the proposed reforms of
recusal procedures are far outweighed by the actual costs in terms of
denial of litigants’ Due Process and the negative impact on public
confidence in the judiciary. Since a challenged jurist—like the rest of
us—cannot be impartial about his own impartiality, the risk of biased
decisions is not limited to “extraordinary circumstances.”307 Rather, it is
a systematic error with which litigants (and their lawyers) must deal
each and every day in courts where the challenged jurist is the sole or
final decision maker in a disqualification dispute.308 Given the enormous
number of opportunities for this error throughout the federal and state
court systems—erroneous disqualification decisions have the potential to
create a serious impact in actual cases decided throughout the United
States.309 So, by removing the challenged jurist at the outset (either
through peremptory challenges or substituting another decision maker),

See JEFFREY M. SHAMAN & JONA GOLDSCHMIDT, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: AN
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF JUDICIAL PRACTICES AND ATTITUDES 66–67 (1995) (describing a survey
that shows judges are more likely to disqualify themselves than to disqualify their
colleagues).
307
See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 887 (2009) (describing the timing,
amount, and relative size of the campaign support offered to Justice Benjamin as creating
an extraordinary situation).
308
See SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 123, at 26 (describing that a total of nineteen states
permit parties to use some form of peremptory challenge to remove one judge per
proceeding); see also FLAMM supra note 76, at 753 (“[A] substantial minority of states have
adopted statutes or court rules that permit a party to seek judicial disqualification on a
peremptory basis.”). However, in most states, the peremptory challenge can be used by a
party only once in a proceeding. Id.
309
See R. LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. STATE CTS., EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE
COURTS:
AN ANALYSIS OF 2010 STATE COURT CASELOADS (Sept. 25, 2012),
http://www.courtstatistics.org/Other-Pages/StateCourtCaseloadStatistics.aspx, archived at
http://perma.cc/7ER5-7PYV (stating that in 2010, the various state courts handled a total
of approximately 19,000,000 civil and 20,000,000 criminal cases for a total of around
38,000,000 new cases (excluding domestic relations, juvenile, and traffic cases) that year).
Of that total, approximately 5,565,000 civil cases were instituted in one of the seventeen
states that permit litigants to use peremptory challenges to remove a judge without any
cause. Id. So, that leaves approximately 13,435,000 cases brought in the state courts in
which the decision to insure a fair trial before a fair tribunal relied on the use of “selfdisqualification” by the challenged jurist. Id.
306
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we actually will improve the efficiency by decreasing the number of
likely appeals from denials of disqualification motions. So, rather than
decrease efficiency, the suggested procedural reform will increase
efficiency.
Moreover, removing the challenged jurist from the disqualification
decision (or at least subjecting a denial to immediate de novo review by
another judge or justice) properly protects the primary purposes of
partiality—fair trials and institutional legitimacy. When a jurist who
reasonably appears to be biased erroneously decides she need not step
aside, that error may negatively impact the litigants’ rights to a fair trial
before a fair tribunal by introducing the jurist’s bias into the decision
making process.310 The mistaken disqualification decision also effects
public confidence in the justice system as a whole by creating negative
perceptions of the jurist, which effect institutional legitimacy.311 In fact,
the appearance of an unfair process may do more harm than the actual
results reached in the particular cases as people are more likely to accept
unfavorable or unexpected results if the decision making process is
perceived as fair.312 Thus, preservation of fair trials and public
confidence in the judiciary demands that we refocus recusal reforms on
procedural protections that remove the challenged jurist as the decision
maker.
3.

The Public Will Not Lose Confidence in the Judiciary as a Result of
Recusal Reform

Third, given the nature of these suggested procedural reforms there
is no reason to believe that the public will have less confidence in specific
disqualification decisions or the judiciary generally. The opposite is
likely to be true since all of the suggested reforms—starting with
removal of a potentially biased decision maker—make the process more
transparent, which usually increases institutional legitimacy and
adherence to outcomes.313 In fact, it is hard to imagine how removing
310
See supra Part IV (describing the important implications for judicial disqualification
and public confidence in the judiciary).
311
Tyler & Rasinski, supra note 264, at 626–27.
312
See Kees van den Bos et al., Evaluating Outcomes by Means of the Fair Process Effect:
Evidence for Different Processes in Fairness and Satisfaction Judgments, 74 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1493, 1494 (1998) (“One of the most important discoveries in research on
procedural and distributive justice has been the finding that perceived procedural fairness
positively affects how people react to outcomes. This instance of the fair process effect is
one of the most frequently replicated findings in social psychology.” (citations omitted)).
313
See supra note 264 and accompanying text (discussing direct and indirect casual
connections between perceived fairness of court procedures, institutional legitimacy, and
adherence to unpopular court decisions).
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the potentially biased decision maker and giving litigants more
meaningful appellate review would result in less confidence (by the
parties or the public) in the fairness of the process. Moreover, when
powerful voices have suggested that reform may lead to more charges of
biased jurists and a loss of public confidence in the judiciary, those
criticisms have been directed at proposed substantive reforms that
would increase the number of grounds for disqualification, not reform
the procedural practices.314 Thus, it seems likely that a more transparent
process is likely to increase rather than decrease confidence in specific
disqualification decisions and the impartiality of the judiciary as a
whole.
4.

Even Intelligent, Informed, and Well-Intentioned Jurists Have a Bias
Blind Spot

Fourth, the conviction—no matter how genuine—that jurists are
capable of making unbiased decisions about their own biases simply is
not supported by the scientific evidence. In fact, the existence and effects
of the Bias Blind Spot have not been seriously challenged in any of the
cognitive or social psychology studies performed to date.315 Also, there
have been empirical studies demonstrating that jurists are subject to a
variety of other cognitive biases just as are ordinary people.316 In
addition, there exists no scientific evidence to support the belief that the
more intelligent among us are less prone to the Bias Blind Spot.317 In
fact, what little evidence does exist on the subject supports the contrary
conclusion—that those who are more intelligent are more likely to
believe they can overcome this cognitive illusion.318
314
See, e.g., Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 893–98 (2009) (Roberts, J.,
dissenting) (posing forty questions about the changed substantive standards for
disqualification under the Due Process Clause).
315
See Joachim I. Krueger & David C. Funder, Towards a Balanced Social Psychology:
Causes, Consequences, and Cures for the Problem-Seeking Approach to Social Behavior and
Cognition, 27 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 1, 5 (2004) (reviewing the literature on a variety of
cognitive illusions and noting no studies that seriously question the existence of the Bias
Blind Spot).
316
See Guthrie et al., supra note 239, at 4 (demonstrating that judges are just as likely to be
affected by a number of cognitive illusions as the ordinary public).
317
See Richard F. West et al., Cognitive Sophistication Does Not Attenuate Bias Blind Spot,
103 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 506, 516 (2012) (indicating the lack of other scientific
studies testing whether superior intellect may ameliorate the effects of the Bias Blind Spot
on certain cognitive functions).
318
See id. at 515 (providing that the bias blind spot effect is “unmitigated by increases in
intelligence [and this result is] consistent with the idea that the mechanisms that cause the
bias [blind spot] are quite fundamental and not easily controlled strategically [because the
cognitive mechanisms at work are] evolutionary and computationally basic”).
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Moreover, the conviction that judges are somehow immune to the
cognitive processes that produce the Bias Blind Spot simply does not
resonate with the common sense views held by many litigants, the press,
and the public, as well as commentators. While our system of
disqualification inherited from English common law included a strong
presumption of judicial impartiality, in the 19th Century some legal
thinkers began to challenge that view as advances were being made in
the psychological sciences.319 In addition, the naïve conviction that
jurists are immune to the Bias Blind Spot is belied by a common sense
review of those disqualification disputes for which we do have written
reasons why the jurist chose to not step aside.320 As a result, there is no
scientific nor common sense reason to doubt that, just like the rest of us,
jurists are affected by the Bias Blind Spot. Thus, procedural reforms that
prohibit the challenged jurist from being the sole or final arbiter of his or
her own biases and other procedural changes designed to make the
process more transparent should not be further stymied by this
misplaced confidence in judicial impartiality.
5.

Appellate Review Procedures
Disqualification Disputes

Do

Not

Erase

Errors

in

Finally, if the challenged jurist declines to disqualify himself and in
so doing makes an erroneous decision because he is actually, probably,
or apparently biased, there is a right to appellate review (except in the
case of SCOTUS)—but there is little chance the decision will be corrected
on appeal. The likelihood of reversal on appeal is remote for at least four
reasons. First, only a fraction of those erroneous disqualification
decisions will ever be appealed given the litigant’s limited time, money,
Second, meaningful review of erroneous
and other resources.321
See, e.g., David Dudley Field, A Few Words on Judicial Integrity, 6 ALB. L.J. 265, 265
(1872) (“Judges are but men, and are swayed like other men by vehement prejudices. This
is corruption in reality, give it whatever other name you please.”); Civil Rights (1883):
Robert
Green
Ingersoll,
SECULAR
WEB,
http://infidels.org/library/historical/
robert_ingersoll/civil_rights.html
(last visited
Mar. 25, 2015), archived
at
http://perma.cc/JT25-WHA6 [hereinafter Robert Green Ingersoll] (“We must remember, too,
that we have to make judges out of men, and that by being made judges their prejudices
are not diminished and their intelligence is not increased.”).
320
See supra Part III (discussing cases from the highest courts in federal and state
judiciary where jurists attempt to explain their lack of bias apparently without considering
or even acknowledging that reasonable others may view the situation differently).
321
See Court Statistics Project, State Court Caseload Statistics, NAT’L CTR. STATE CTS. (2012),
http://www.courtstatistics.org/Other-Pages/StateCourtCaseloadStatistics.aspx, archived at
http://perma.cc/7ER5-7PYV (explaining that in 2010, although a total of 37,945,591 civil
and criminal cases were pending in the state courts, only 272,975 appeals were filed in
either the intermediate court of appeal or the court of last resort in all fifty states). In 2013,
319
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decisions is often not available due to the largely discretionary nature of
the right to review most disqualification decisions.322 Third, even when
there is a right to appeal, the standard for review on appeal and the
accompanying procedures result in delayed and less than meaningful
reviews of such decisions.323 Fourth, some studies have found that due
to cultural norms, jurists are less likely to direct disqualification of a
colleague on their court or another court than they are to step aside
themselves—even though recusal is a rare occurrence in cases not
involving per se disqualification standards.324 Thus, even though the
litigant may have a right to appeal the disqualification decision, the right
does not provide meaningful relief in a large number of cases where an
erroneous decision has been made.
Although all three of these factors impact the effectiveness of the
appellate review of any disqualification decisions, it may not be possible
for the judiciary to address all of these issues effectively. First, the
judiciary can do little or nothing to increase the time, money, and other
resources that litigants have available to appeal seemingly erroneous
disqualification decisions. Second, while judicial education regarding
the impact of cognitive biases affecting judicial decisions may improve
the understanding and perspective jurists bring to disqualification
disputes, that type of reform effort takes time and requires regular
reinforcement. Moreover, we simply do not know if educating jurists in
this way actually will work and what little evidence there is regarding
the impact of such efforts suggests that enlightening people about the
Bias Blind Spot and other cognitive errors does not negate their effect on
our thinking.325 Thus, it appears that the judiciary can have little
although a total of 375,870 new cases, including 284,604 civil cases, were filed in the federal
district courts, only 56,475 appeals (or fewer than 17% of pending cases) were commenced
in the United States Courts of Appeals. JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS:
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 2013, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/
statistics/judicialbusiness/2013.aspx (last visited Apr. 21, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/2RLP-NPTL.
322
See supra Part V.A.1.b (describing the connection between the right to review and the
discretionary nature of making the decision).
323
See Stempel, supra note 258, at 804–05 (arguing that abuse of discretion and harmless
error standards should be replaced by a de novo review because disqualification decisions
made by the challenged jurist is suspect given a host of biasing influences and a
professional culture that creates reluctant recusants).
324
See SHAMAN & GOLDSCHMIDT, supra note 306, at 67 (“The data from this survey show
that judges are more inclined to disqualify themselves than they are to recommend that a
colleague do so. This finding, it could be argued, militates against having another judge
rule on the disqualification issue.”).
325
See Pronin & Kugler, supra note 183, at 566–67 (explaining that the limited research
conducted on the effects of educational efforts demonstrates that while such efforts might
increase awareness of the existence of this cognitive illusion, there is no scientific support
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meaningful impact on the first two factors, so procedures must be
reformed to create meaningful change.
VI. THE PURPOSES OF IMPARTIALITY
Of course, any proposed reform of disqualification practices should
promote the underlying purposes of judicial impartiality. There are a
myriad of ways one could identify and explain those underlying
purposes of judicial impartiality. First, an evaluation of the federal and
state substantive standards for disqualification (whether code or
common law based) and their application would reveal some explicit
and implicit goals of judicial impartiality. Second, a similar review of the
federal and state standards for judicial conduct and their application also
would reveal a clearer understanding of the goals of those rules. Third,
an assessment of historical materials that address the initial
establishment of our tri-parte system of government and the role of the
judiciary in that structure would reveal yet other desired reasons for
judicial impartiality. However, in this Article, the purposes of partiality
will be assessed using the framework developed by Dean and Professor
Charles Gardner Geyh in his recent piece exploring “the three
dimensions of impartiality” in our judicial system.326
A. The Three Dimensions of Impartiality
There are three distinct, but somewhat overlapping, dimensions of
impartiality: the procedural, the political, and the ethical.327 The
“procedural dimension” of impartiality is aimed at affording the
particular parties in a specific case a fair hearing, which necessarily
The “political dimension” of
requires a fair decision maker.328
for the idea that education can overcome the effects of the Bias Blind Spot). Further, an
experiment in which participants who were educated about the pitfalls of relying on
introspection tended to cease claiming they were less prone to bias but noting such
education made no actual impact on participants’ decision making. Id.; see also Cynthia
McPherson Frantz, I AM Being Fair: The Bias Blind Spot as a Stumbling Block to Seeing Both
Sides, 28 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 157, 166 (2006) (discussing the backfiring effect of
efforts to educate others about unconscious bias and correcting for liking or disliking
somebody).
326
See The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality, supra note 21, at 493 (“judicial impartiality
[can be conceptualized] in three distinct dimensions: a procedural dimension, . . . a
political dimension, . . . and an ethical dimension”).
327
See id. (discussing the procedural, political, and ethical dimensions).
328
See id. at 511 (discussing the interest of judicial impartiality). Geyh discusses the
procedural dimension of impartiality as follows:
[T]he interest [of the parties] in judicial impartiality is personal to
them, acutely felt, case-specific, and shaped by firsthand experience.
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impartiality is concerned with the role that jurists play in the
administration of justice and the public’s perceptions of how that role is
served within the larger governmental structure.329 The focus of the
ethical dimension is yet a different constituency—jurists themselves,
who have a stake in not only the legitimacy that impartiality creates for
the judiciary as a whole but how it shapes their own identity in their role
within that legal institution.330 Thus, any proposed reforms of recusal
practices will be viewed through these three lenses: the procedural
dimension, the political dimension, and the ethical dimension.
B. A Framework for Assessing Recusal Reforms
This Article uses these three dimensions of impartiality as a
framework for assessing the current state of disqualification practice and
to evaluate the proposed reforms of recusal procedures. This type of
application of Dean Geyh’s three-part framework of impartiality appears
to be exactly how he hoped scholars would use his work.331 Also, this
The focus of their attention is on the process employed to litigate their
cases, and whether that process protected them adequately from the
perils of partiality . . . . This, then, is the procedural dimension of
impartiality.
Id.
See id. at 512 (distinguishing the connection between the public’s interest and an
impartial judiciary). Geyh states:
[T]he public’s interest in an impartial judiciary is less personal than
philosophical or ideological, more diffuse than acute, systematic rather
than case-specific . . . and shaped less by firsthand experience than by
impressions gleaned from public discussions on the acceptability of
judges to the body politic. In other words, the focus of the public’s
attention is on the impartiality of judges in relation to the role they
play in the administration of government, which is ‘political’ in the
original sense of the term.
Id.
330
See The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality, supra note 21, at 512 (discussing the interest
of judges in impartiality). The following describes the dimensions of impartiality:
As adjudicators at the center of the litigation process, judges have an
interest in the procedural dimension of impartiality; as representatives
of the third branch of government, judges desire institutional
legitimacy and consequently have an interest in the political dimension
of impartiality, too. But as women and men whose self-identity as
good judges is tethered to the oath they have sworn to be impartial—
an oath judges have taken for centuries—there is a third dimension of
impartiality: an ethical dimension.
Id.
331
See id. at 493 (describing the need to re-think judicial impartiality). Geyh explains:
Scholars have traditionally analyzed judicial impartiality piecemeal, in
disconnected debates on discrete topics. As a consequence, current
understandings of judicial impartiality are balkanized and muddled.
329
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three dimensional perspective of impartiality fits neatly within much of
what SCOTUS has, in its Due Process Clause cases, declared about the
purposes of impartiality in our judicial system. 332 Thus, this Article uses
the framework of the three dimensions to assess judicial impartiality and
proposed reforms of current procedures and practices used to decide
disqualification disputes.
1.

Promoting Fairness in Litigation

First, in the procedural dimension, if the proposed reforms are
adopted, then the parties are more likely to get a fair trial than is possible
using the self-disqualification method. This is true because any jurist
who was actually, probably, or even apparently biased has been
removed from the decision making process through either peremptory
challenges, reassignment of the disqualification dispute to another jurist,
or immediate de novo review of any self-disqualification decision.333
When that kind of structural bias is eliminated, we necessarily improve
the outcomes.
In addition, the other proposed procedural protections will promote
more openness and transparency that will positively affect outcomes in
disqualification disputes. The requirement of full disclosure of all
interests and connections beyond the more limited disclosures now
required by both the jurist and the parties will help insure that all the
relevant information is available to both the litigants and the decision
maker. Also, the mandate of a written and published opinion when
disqualification is denied will help because if the targeted jurist or other
neutral decision maker knows her reasoning process will be subject to
This Article seeks to reconceptualize judicial impartiality
comprehensively, across all contexts. . . . [Thus], this Article offers a
new perspective, not just on judicial impartiality, but also on the role
of the American judiciary in the administration of justice and the
political process.
Id.
See, e.g., Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 869, 877 (2009) (“Because the
objective standards implementing the Due Process Clause do not require proof of actual
bias, . . . [but do require disqualification when] ‘experience teaches that the probability of
actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally
tolerable.’”); Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (declaring the need to
“preserve[] both the appearance and the reality of fairness, ‘[which] generat[es] the
feeling[], so important to a popular government, that justice has been done’ . . . by ensuring
that no person will be deprived of his interests in the absence of a proceeding in which he
may present his case with assurance that the arbiter is not predisposed to find against
him”); see also In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (finding that an impartial judge is
necessary to maintain the legitimacy of court proceedings).
333
See Stempel, supra note 258, at 804–05 (discussing the benefits of alternative forms of
review).
332
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some review, then she is more likely to insure that the reasoning is
sound and meets the objective standard for disqualification. However,
even if outcomes in disqualification disputes are not changed by these
proposed procedural reforms, at least the litigants’ comfort level will be
increased by having an impartial jurist (or group of jurists) decide or
immediately review the question of disqualification using the decision
making process should give the parties more confidence in the
outcome—even if the result is not to their liking.
2.

Promoting Public Confidence in the Courts

Second, in the political dimension, these proposed changes mean the
public also is more likely to have confidence in the impartiality of the
specific jurist who hears the case and, in turn, the judicial system
generally. This is true because when the potentially biased jurist who is
the target of the disqualification motion is removed, the process is more
impartial—or at least appears to be more open and fair. This resulting
impartiality or perception of impartiality is bolstered by the twin
requirements of complete disclosure and a full explanation that must be
written and published if disqualification is denied. These more
transparent procedures allow the public (as well as the litigants) to better
understand the reasoning behind the disqualification decision. Again,
the use of a seemingly fair process—which is in keeping with procedural
norms used for other litigation—helps the public accept even negative
outcomes in controversial cases. Thus, the proposed reforms will help
enhance public perceptions of the impartiality of the bench by using
disqualification procedures that eliminate or at least mostly avoid
inherent biases (including the Bias Blind Spot) and do so using an open
and transparent process.
3.

Promoting the Role of Jurists as Ethical Actors

Third, in the ethical dimension, the proposed recusal reforms will
promote an enhanced view of jurists as ethical actors among not only the
parties and the public, but among members of the bench. As noted
above, the proposed changes in the identity of the decision maker and
the openness of the process will create a perception of greater fairness
among the parties and the public, which in turn will create goodwill for
the entire judiciary and individual members of the bench. Also, while
jurists concerned about their own roles and reputations for impartiality
may be a bit uneasy about another jurist making these disqualification
decisions, there are some built-in safeguards. The targeted jurists should
be somewhat comforted that in nearly all instances the question is not
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about actual or even probable partiality but merely the appearance of
possible bias (and if peremptory challenges are adopted no bias need be
alleged). Also, since the proposed reforms do not require jurists to write
and publish an opinion supporting a decision to recuse, the jurist can
still quietly step aside when needed. In addition, since most jurists are
even less likely to disqualify a colleague than recuse themselves, the
instances of removal of a judge or justice from a specific case should not
be so frequent as to unfairly jeopardize a specific jurists’ ethical
reputation. Moreover, this kind of self-policing of the profession will
likely enhance the public perception of jurists as committed to the rule of
impartiality—counterbalancing any negative effects that might come
from a more open and transparent review of those situations when a
jurist does not self-disqualify and that decision is reversed after review
by others. Thus, all jurists—even when the subject of recusal requests—
will benefit from the increased confidence the reforms create in the
parties and the public, as well as a renewed sense of professionalism
among members of the bench.
Using this three-part framework, the reforms to disqualification
procedures proposed in this Article appear to support and even enhance
the procedural, the political, and the ethical dimensions of impartiality.
VII. CONCLUSION
In recent years, several high profile disqualification disputes have
caught the attention of the press, the pundits, and the public, and have
raised serious questions about the impartiality of specific jurists and the
judiciary generally. While it is too early to determine whether these
controversies will create a long-term impact on the public’s confidence in
the courts, it is not too early to reform recusal practices to address one of
the most significant problems—the impact of the Bias Blind Spot on
disqualification decisions. The needed reforms could be achieved by
either modifying substantive standards or changing procedural
practices. Given that there is little agreement on the substantive
standards for judicial bias beyond the currently enumerated grounds for
disqualification, the best possible way to eliminate the Bias Blind Spot is
to reshape the procedures used to decide disqualification disputes.
The recusal reforms should not only avoid this cognitive pitfall, but
should further the primary purposes of impartiality: the protection of
litigants’ rights to a fair trial, the maintenance of public confidence in the
courts, and the support of jurists’ roles as ethical actors in the legal
systems. The procedural reforms that are most likely to affect significant
change in disqualification disputes demand we: (1) remove the
challenged jurist from the disqualification decision or replace the
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deferential abuse of discretion appellate review standard with a de novo
review standard and permit intermediate or interlocutory appeals when
disqualification is denied; (2) require meaningful and timely disclosure
of potential conflicts by both the jurists and the parties; and (3) mandate
that all decisions denying disqualification give reasons for the result, be
written, and made available to the public. This reshaping of recusal
procedures can go a long way towards protecting litigants’ rights to a
fair trial and preserving the institutional legitimacy of the judiciary, and,
if these reforms are honored by the bench, correcting our vision of jurists
as ethical actors within our democracy.
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